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THE SUPREME ASSIMILATION OF PATENT LAW
Peter Lee*
Although tensions between universality and exceptionalism apply throughout
law, they are particularly pronounced in patent law, a field that deals with
highly technical subject matter. This Article explores these tensions by investigating an underappreciated descriptive theory of Supreme Court patent jurisprudence. Significantly extending previous scholarship, it argues that the
Court’s recent decisions reflect a project of eliminating “patent exceptionalism” and assimilating patent doctrine to general legal principles (or, more
precisely, to what the Court frames as general legal principles). Among other
motivations, this trend responds to rather exceptional patent doctrine emanating from the Federal Circuit in areas as varied as appellate review of lower
courts, remedies, and the award of attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court has
consistently sought to eliminate patent exceptionalism in these and other areas, bringing patent law in conformity with general legal standards. Among
other implications, this development reveals the Supreme Court’s holistic outlook as a generalist court concerned with broad legal consistency, concerns
which are less pertinent to the quasi-specialized Federal Circuit. Turning to
normative considerations, this Article argues in favor of selective, refined exceptionalism for patent law. Although the Supreme Court should strive for
broad consistency, certain unique features of patent law—particularly the role
and expertise of the Federal Circuit—justify some departure from general legal norms. Finally, this Article turns to tensions between legal universality and
exceptionalism more broadly, articulating principles to guide the deviation of
specialized areas of law from transcendent principles.
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“The remoter and more general aspects of the law are those which give
it universal interest. It is through them that you not only become a great
master in your calling, but connect your subject with the universe and catch
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an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the
universal law.”1
Introduction
Perhaps Justice Thomas is an intellectual heir to Gottfried Leibniz. Certainly, there is much separating the current Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court from the Enlightenment philosopher and mathematician. But Justice
Thomas’s opinion in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., which rejects a specialized rule to determine injunctive relief in patent cases in favor of a general equitable framework,2 bears Leibniz’s intellectual stamp. Leibniz made
many contributions,3 but he is perhaps best known as one of the most
prominent systematizers of the seventeenth century.4 Leibniz sought to find
transcendent principles in natural and mathematical phenomena, thus revealing the unified nature of the universe.5 Leibniz’s quest for universality
and intellectual coherence impacted law, ultimately informing the notion of
“legal science” associated with Christopher Columbus Langdell and other
nineteenth century formalists.6 This systemizing spirit is evident in Justice
Thomas’s eBay opinion, which frames itself as rejecting patent exceptionalism in favor of universal legal principles. This universalizing ethos is both
substantive and rhetorical; indeed, the Court’s eBay rule was actually quite
novel, but the Court framed it as reflecting general equitable principles, and
it has subsequently become the legal norm.7 This universalizing ethos, moreover, represents an undertheorized feature of recent Supreme Court patent
jurisprudence.
Although tensions between universality and exceptionalism apply
throughout law,8 they are particularly relevant to patent law, which deals
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Dedication, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 478
(1897).
2. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
3. Leibniz, not surprisingly, also wrote about law. See M. H. Hoeflich, Law & Geometry:
Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 30 Am. J. Legal Hist. 95, 99–100 (1986).
4. See Robert McRae, The Unity of the Sciences: Bacon, Descartes, and Leibniz, 18 J. Hist.
Ideas 27, 27 (1957).
5. See Hoeflich, supra note 3, at 99–102.
6. See id. at 95.
7. See infra notes 186–187 and accompanying text.
8. A large and growing literature examines doctrinal exceptionalism in a variety of legal
fields. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial
Deference, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1537 (2006) (examining tax exceptionalism); Kevin R. Johnson,
Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009-13: A New Era of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism,
68 Okla. L. Rev. 57 (2015) (tracing the demise of “immigration exceptionalism” in Supreme
Court doctrine); Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce Jurisdiction: Same-Sex Couples and
Minimum Contacts, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1669 (2011) (examining “family law exceptionalism”);
Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy Administration, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 384 (2012) (suggesting proposals to counter structural exceptionalism
in bankruptcy law); Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1897 (2015) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s recent rulings
reject foreign relations exceptionalism).
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with highly technical subject matter. This Article draws on these tensions to
offer new insight on the Supreme Court’s recent patent jurisprudence. Over
the past decade and a half, the Supreme Court has significantly increased its
review of patent decisions from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
a quasi-specialized appellate court established in 1982 that hears appeals of
patent matters from district courts and the Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO). Commentators have offered several theories to interpret this development. First, many observers view these interventions as attempts by the
Supreme Court to rein in expansive Federal Circuit doctrine that has made it
too easy to obtain patents and unduly enhanced their power.9 Second, commentators note that the Court has consistently adopted holistic standards to
replace the bright-line, formalistic rules that are characteristic of Federal
Circuit patent doctrine.10
This Article augments these prevailing interpretations by exploring an
underappreciated descriptive theory of Supreme Court patent doctrine. Significantly extending previous scholarship, it argues that the Supreme Court’s
recent patent jurisprudence reflects a project of eliminating “patent exceptionalism” and assimilating patent doctrine to general legal principles. In
substantial part, this trend responds to rather exceptional patent doctrine
emanating from the Federal Circuit in areas as varied as appellate review of
lower courts, remedies, and the award of attorney’s fees. In these and other
areas, the Supreme Court has consistently sought to eliminate patent exceptionalism, bringing patent law in conformity with what it characterizes as
general legal standards.11 Notably, this Article also argues that the Supreme
Court has utilized assimilation both rhetorically as well as substantively,
framing novel doctrine in the language of assimilation.
This Article represents the first comprehensive examination of patent
assimilation across myriad doctrinal areas. Among other contributions, it
9. See infra Section II.A.
10. See infra Section II.B.
11. Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in Patent Law, 3 IP
Theory 62, 70–71 (2013). This assimilationist drive encompasses and extends well beyond a
more intuitive form of assimilation: the Court’s reconciliation of patent law with other intellectual property doctrines, particularly copyright. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health &
Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014) (citing Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534
(1994)) (drawing on the “comparable context of [copyright]” to help determine the award of
attorney’s fees in patent cases); Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2067
(2011) (drawing on copyright doctrine to inform the mental state requirement for induced
infringement in patent law); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392–93 (2006)
(drawing on copyright law to support the use of a four-factor equitable test to determine
injunctive relief in patent disputes); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545
U.S. 913, 936–37 (2005) (drawing on patent law to inform the copyright standard for contributory infringement); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439
(1984) (“The closest analogy is provided by the patent law cases to which it is appropriate to
refer because of the historic kinship between patent law and copyright law.”). The Court’s
interest in assimilating patent and copyright law is not surprising given their common constitutional foundations. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing authority for Congress to
create both patent and copyright systems).
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shows that assimilation provides an expansive interpretive theory of Supreme Court patent jurisprudence that encompasses not only recent rulings
but cases dating back to the establishment of the Federal Circuit. Although
previous scholarship has recognized individual elements of this phenomenon,12 this comprehensive account of assimilation reveals that it takes a variety of forms in different contexts. The Supreme Court has strictly applied
“trans-substantive”13 regulatory regimes such as the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and jurisdictional statutes to patent law. It has (somewhat imprecisely) invoked traditional equitable principles to displace specialized rules for patent disputes. The Court has
reasoned by analogy, borrowing and applying concepts from legal fields unrelated to patent law. It has favored general, ordinary connotations of legal
terms instead of specialized ones. And it has eliminated per se rules at the
intersection of patent law and antitrust. Throughout, the Court has consistently assimilated patent law to its conception of broader legal concepts.
While in large part the Court has sought to conform exceptional Federal
Circuit doctrine to established legal norms, Supreme Court assimilation extends beyond this pattern. Under the rubric of assimilation, the Court has
also created new doctrine and labeled it as mainstream, reversed the Federal
Circuit on open questions of law as well as faithful application of precedent,
and stamped out “exceptional” patent doctrine from courts other than the
Federal Circuit.
Beyond providing a deep descriptive account of Supreme Court patent
assimilation, this Article analyzes its diverse and complex motivations. This
Article argues that much (but not all) of the Court’s assimilationist project
represents a direct response to exceptionalist patent doctrine from the Federal Circuit. Furthermore, the Court’s rulings seek to rein in not only patent
doctrine but the Federal Circuit itself, whose exceptional patent jurisprudence has tended to increase its own power. More broadly, the Court’s assimilationist project reflects its holistic orientation as a generalist court
concerned with legal consistency and policy considerations that range beyond the specialized patent system. These observations reveal a deep institutional irony. Congress created the Federal Circuit to unify patent law; in
doing so, that court has developed rather exceptional doctrine. In its recent
12. See, e.g., Robin Feldman, Ending Patent Exceptionalism and Structuring the Rule of
Reason: The Supreme Court Opens the Door for Both, 15 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 61 (2014);
Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1791,
1817–18 (2013); C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1553, 1561 (2006); Holbrook, supra note 11, at
71–72; Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 Yale L.J. 2, 77–78 (2010) ; David O.
Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law Adjudication: Rules and Standards, 46
Conn. L. Rev. 415, 473–80 (2013).
13. As I use it here, “trans-substantive” refers to a property of doctrine, rules, or principles that are intended to apply universally across multiple substantive fields of law. I adopt
here a wider conception of trans-substantive law than that which focuses solely on process and
procedure. See Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the
Rules, 84 Yale L.J. 718, 718 (1975); David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of
American Law, 2013 BYU L. Rev. 1191, 1194.
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patent rulings, however, the Supreme Court has played the role of unifier on
a grander scale, consistently eliminating such exceptionalism. Additionally,
focusing on legal assimilation helps reduce the Supreme Court’s cognitive
burdens when engaging unfamiliar technical details of the patent system.
Finally, as noted, the Court has utilized assimilation to rhetorical effect,
sometimes framing novel doctrine as “mainstream” to enhance its
legitimacy.
Turning to normative analysis, this Article then assesses the Supreme
Court’s assimilation of patent law. It argues against strict universalism and
contends that the special nature of patent law—particularly the unique role
and expertise of the Federal Circuit—justifies a certain degree of exceptionalism from general doctrine. Finally, this Article extrapolates from the methodological differences of the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit to
suggest strategies for navigating tensions between legal universality and exceptionalism more broadly. It argues that courts should consider institutional specialization and the policy objectives underlying statutes and
doctrine, as well as employ adaptable standards rather than rigid rules, to
provide beneficial flexibility within unified legal regimes.
This Article proceeds in six parts. Part I examines the general tension
between universality and exceptionalism in law. It explores the value of legal
universality as articulated in formalistic “legal science” as well as its continuing influence in contemporary times. Part II considers the Supreme Court’s
recent patent jurisprudence. It describes prevailing interpretive theories of
the Court’s intervention, which focus on reining in overly expansive patent
doctrine and replacing formalistic rules with holistic standards. Part III explores an underappreciated descriptive theory of Supreme Court patent jurisprudence, arguing that the Court has consistently assimilated patent
doctrine to (what it characterizes as) transcendent legal principles in a wide
range of doctrinal areas. Part IV analyzes the Court’s assimilationist project,
examining its scope and underlying motivations. Among other considerations, it argues that the Court’s universalizing jurisprudence reflects its role
as a generalist court atop the judicial hierarchy, particularly in contradistinction to the quasi-specialized Federal Circuit. Part V questions the Court’s
strict adherence to universalism and argues in favor of selective exceptionalism in patent law based on institutional expertise. Part VI revisits universality and exceptionalism more generally. It challenges the value of legal
assimilation and articulates general principles to help determine when and
how specialized areas of law should deviate from broad norms.
I. Universality and Exceptionalism in Law
Law’s aspirations for universal consistency have long roots. Indeed,
Leibniz himself saw law as an integrated system on par with mathematics.14
An important intellectual foundation of “legal universalism” is the formalist

14. See Hoeflich, supra note 3, at 99–100.
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movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,15 which is
often associated with Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell of Harvard Law
School.16 There are many dimensions to formalism, but most relevant for
present purposes is a belief that “the law was comprised of principles . . .
broad in their generality, few in their number, and clear enough to permit
answers to the questions of law to be more or less directly deduced.”17 Formalism was part of Langdell’s conception of “legal science,”18 which held
that “law can be reduced to a set of first principles, on the order of mathematical axioms, and that by the use of deductive method, these principles
can yield all necessary consequences.”19 This systematizing spirit lent itself to
logical and doctrinal consistency across legal fields20 and discouraged tailoring doctrine to particular contexts and circumstances.21
Responding to formalism, realists were skeptical of decontextualized and
hyperlogical legal reasoning,22 but they were also committed to legal universalism in their own way. Writing in 1897, Oliver Wendell Holmes warned
against a conception of law that “can be worked out like mathematics from
some general axioms of conduct.”23 After all, for Holmes, “[t]he life of the
law has not been logic: it has been experience.”24 Nonetheless, this accumulated body of experience provided a foundation for coherence and universality. Although realists like Holmes rejected Langdellian formalism,25 they
“retained but reinterpreted in pragmatist fashion the structure of abstract
legal concepts and principles that had been the primary focus of Classical
legal thought.”26 For Holmes, the aim of legal thought was to render the
teachings of centuries of reports, treatises, and statutes in the United States
15. See Howard Schweber, The “Science” of Legal Science: The Model of the Natural Sciences in Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education, 17 Law & Hist. Rev. 421, 421 (1999);
Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in Modern American Law: A View from Century’s End, 49
Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 10–16 (1999).
16. Wetlaufer, supra note 15, at 10–11.
17. Id. at 12; see also C.C. Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts, at vi–vii (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1871) (explaining that only relatively few cases
are “useful and necessary” for the purpose of mastering legal doctrine).
18. Hoeflich, supra note 3, at 95; see also Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal
Thought, 106 Yale L.J. 493, 495 (1996) (book review) (describing “Langdellian legal science”).
19. Hoeflich, supra note 3, at 96; see also Grey, supra note 18, at 495–96 (noting that,
within Langdellian legal science, “rules descend[ ] deductively from a small number of coherently interrelated fundamental concepts and principles”).
20. See Schweber, supra note 15, at 453 (“In legal science the ideal of the grand synthesis
meant that analogies could be drawn from one area of law to another . . . .”).
21. Wetlaufer, supra note 15, at 12.
22. Id. at 18.
23. Holmes, supra note 1, at 465.
24. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2009) (1881).
25. This is a conventional account of the transition between various schools of thought.
Other scholars, however, posit less of an oscillation between formalism and realism and emphasize overlapping patterns and themes among various intellectual movements. See, e.g.,
Grey, supra note 18, at 508.
26. Id. at 498.
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and England “more precise, and to generalize them into a thoroughly connected system.”27 Though rooted in experience more than formal logic, the
realists also envisioned a coherent legal system in which legal practices could
be distilled to a limited number of rules to help resolve myriad kinds of
disputes.28
The realists’ systemizing spirit is evident in several legal reform projects,
such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the APA.29 Although realism
is often associated with skepticism about rules, realists embraced rules as
valuable “guides to how predecessors had resolved similar legal problems in
the past.”30 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1938, distilled
centuries of collective wisdom regarding the proper resolution of legal disputes, and they sought to bring greater consistency and coherence to the
sprawling arena of modern litigation.31 This systemizing spirit is also evident
in the APA, which Congress enacted in 1946. The burgeoning New Deal
bureaucracy gave rise to a need for greater standardization of administrative
practice,32 and the APA quite clearly aimed “to achieve relative uniformity in
the administrative machinery of the Federal Government.”33
The value of universality is evident in other influential schools of legal
thought as well. For example, the legal process school, which flowered in the
1950s,34 prioritized the rule of law and emphasized “consistency with the
broader legal fabric.”35 Particularly relevant to this Article, the legal process
27. Holmes, supra note 1, at 457–58.
28. See id. at 458.
29. Such projects also include the Restatements of Law and the Uniform Law Initiatives.
See Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., A Century of Service: A Centennial History of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 11–12 (1991); Grant
Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Causes and Cure, 70 Yale L.J. 1037, 1043–44 (1961).
30. David Marcus, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Legal Realism as a Jurisprudence of Law Reform, 44 Ga. L. Rev. 433, 443 (2010); see also Robert G. Bone, Mapping the
Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1989).
31. See generally Bone, supra note 30 (describing civil procedure reforms leading to the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Marcus, supra note 30 (positing a jurisprudential link between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and realism); Stephen N. Subrin,
How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909, 943–75 (1987) (providing a historical examination of the evolution of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
32. Marcus, supra note 13, at 1211.
33. Tom C. Clark, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 5, 5–6 (1947); see also Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dep’t of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 271 (1994); Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950) (“One purpose [of the Administrative Procedure Act] was to
introduce greater uniformity of procedure and standardization of administrative practice
among the diverse agencies whose customs had departed widely from each other.”); Sapna
Kumar, The Accidental Agency?, 65 Fla. L. Rev. 229, 235 (2013); Marcus, supra note 13, at
1214.
34. Wetlaufer, supra note 15, at 21.
35. Simona Grossi, A Modified Theory of the Law of Federal Courts: The Case of ArisingUnder Jurisdiction, 88 Wash. L. Rev. 961, 969 (2013); see also Marcus, supra note 13, at 1217
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school championed general and neutral principles of procedure and institutional design,36 particularly concerning judicial review and administrative
law.37 Themes of universality are also evident in the legal positivist/analytic
tradition.38 Legal positivists tend to emphasize law’s coherence, integrity,
and fit, and they view language (especially legal terms) as largely fixed and
determinate across various contexts.39 This preoccupation with universality
and uniformity continues into contemporary times.40
Although the law has long prized universalism and broad consistency,
these values frequently clash with the sprawling, technical nature of law and
a countervailing pull toward tailoring legal domains to their unique subject
matter. The rise of the administrative state has challenged fundamental
yearnings for universalism; indeed, in the modern technocratic landscape, it
might seem odd to apply the same rules governing standing, procedure, and
remedies to First Amendment challenges, environmental cases, and tax disputes.41 This tension between universality and exceptionalism is especially
acute in patent law, which is distinctive because of its highly technical nature
as well as the unique role of the quasi-specialized Federal Circuit. To explore
this tension, it is helpful to first consider the context of the Supreme Court’s
recent interventions in patent law, a topic to which the next Part turns.
II. The Supreme Court’s Recent Forays into Patent Law
One of the most notable developments in patent law over the past decade and a half has been the Supreme Court’s aggressive intervention in patent affairs. Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982 as a quasispecialized court to hear appeals in patent matters (and a limited set of other
types of disputes) from district courts and the PTO.42 For the first decade or

(“[L]egal process jurisprudence . . . created a fertile intellectual environment for trans-substantivity’s entrenchment.”).
36. Wetlaufer, supra note 15, at 27–31.
37. Id. at 24; see also Grey, supra note 18, at 504 (“[T]he Process jurists did for American
jurisdiction and procedure what the Classical legal thinkers had done for substantive private
law—they reduced it to a doctrinal system.”).
38. See Wetlaufer, supra note 15, at 43–48.
39. Id. at 46.
40. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the
Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 Yale L.J. 105, 116 (1993) (“The law (or a part of the law) is
coherent if the principles, policies, and purposes that could justify it form a coherent set,
which in turn means that all conflicts among them are resolved in a principled, reasonable,
and nonarbitrary fashion.”).
41. See Cover, supra note 13, at 732–33.
42. See Paul R. Michel, Assuring Consistency and Uniformity of Precedent and Legal Doctrine in the Areas of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Entrusted Exclusively to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit: A View from the Top, 58 Am. U. L. Rev. 699, 699, 702 (2009).
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so of the Federal Circuit’s existence, the Supreme Court rarely reviewed patent cases.43 Instead, the Supreme Court allowed this new court to develop its
institutional authority and legitimacy by deferring to its specialized expertise. However, the tide began to turn about a decade and a half ago as the
Supreme Court began increasing its review of patent appeals from the Federal Circuit.44 The Court’s recent activity has sparked significant commentary regarding its involvement in patent adjudication and how its efforts are
reshaping patent doctrine. In particular, commentators have argued that the
Supreme Court has sought to curb patent rights that had become too expansive under the Federal Circuit and to replace formalistic rules with holistic
standards. These theories provide a backdrop for the descriptive theory advanced in this Article, which argues that the Court has consistently sought to
eliminate patent exceptionalism.
A.

Constraining the Power of Patents

In many ways, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions have reined in patent rights that had become quite expansive under Federal Circuit jurisprudence.45 Around the turn of the millennium, widespread concerns began to
arise that, in some contexts, patents may actually impede rather than promote technological progress. Influential reports from the Federal Trade
Commission and the National Research Council questioned the perceived
excesses of the patent system.46 The PTO’s penchant for issuing large numbers of “bad patents”—those that are undeserving of protection or at least
warrant greater scrutiny—generated concerns over the innovation-dampening effects of patents.47 Similarly, commentators warned of patent anticommons and thickets in which large numbers of exclusive rights
thwarted innovative efforts.48 In the eyes of many, these deficiencies directly
43. Taylor, supra note 12, at 418 (finding that during the Federal Circuit’s first decade,
the Supreme Court only reviewed one case dealing with substantive patent law, in which it
affirmed the Federal Circuit).
44. In addition to other factors, the Solicitor General has helped spur the Supreme Court
to hear more patent cases. See John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor
General, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 518, 536–37 (2010); Paul R. Gugliuzza, IP Injury and the
Institutions of Patent Law, 98 Iowa L. Rev. 747, 766–68 (2013).
45. See, e.g., Steve Seidenberg, Reinventing Patent Law, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2008, at 58, 60.
46. See, e.g., FTC, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition
and Patent Law and Policy (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q8W4-WC7U]; Nat’l Research Council, A Patent System for the 21st
Century (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004).
47. See Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why “Bad” Patents Survive in the Market and
How Should We Change?—The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 Emory L.J. 61, 75–76
(2006). But see Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58
Emory L.J. 181 (2008) (questioning the thesis that the PTO grants a high proportion of patent
applications).
48. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698 (1998); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the
Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Innovation Policy and the Economy 119, 119–22 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds.,

June 2016]

The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law

1423

related to Federal Circuit doctrine enhancing the power and prevalence of
patents.49
Certainly, the Supreme Court’s patent jurisprudence fits comfortably
within this thesis of constraining patent rights. In the realm of patentable
subject matter, the Court has invalidated patents claiming: business methods,50 processes of improving the therapeutic efficacy of drugs,51 isolated
DNA,52 and software.53 The Court has also elevated the nonobviousness
standard54 and the requirement of claim definiteness.55 Turning from patentability to infringement, the Court has imposed constraints on the doctrine
of equivalents,56 liberally interpreted statutory exceptions to patent infringement,57 narrowed the circumstances that qualify as foreign58 and induced
infringement,59 and expansively interpreted the exhaustion of patent rights.60
Turning to remedies, the Court has also rendered it more difficult for patentees to get injunctions.61 Additionally, the Court has made it easier for licensees to challenge the validity of patents they are licensing.62 Although there

2001); see also Peter Yun-hyoung Lee, Inverting the Logic of Scientific Discovery: Applying Common Law Patentable Subject Matter Doctrine to Constrain Patents on Biotechnology Research
Tools, 19 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 79, 80–81 (2005) (“[P]atents on research tools . . . can effectively
create individual property rights that impinge upon broad areas of scientific inquiry.”).
49. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts,
64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 25–30 (1989); Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit’s Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 J. Legal Stud. 85, 87 (2006); Arti K.
Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103
Colum. L. Rev. 1035, 1114 (2003) (“At bottom, then, the Federal Circuit’s major decisions in
recent years may have been influenced by bias toward patent holders.”).
50. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
51. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
52. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
53. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
54. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
55. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014).
56. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
57. See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005); Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
58. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007).
59. Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014).
60. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008). But see Bowman v.
Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (holding that exhaustion doctrine did not allow unauthorized replanting of patented genetically altered seeds).
61. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392–93 (2006).
62. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 124–31 (2007).

1424

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 114:1413

are some exceptions,63 the vast majority of recent Supreme Court cases have
constrained patent rights.64
B. Favoring Holistic Standards over Formalistic Rules
In addition to constraining substantive patent rights, the Supreme
Court has consistently embraced holistic standards over formalistic rules. As
many commentators have observed, Federal Circuit patent doctrine generally takes the form of bright-line rules.65 This preference for rules may be
part and parcel of the court’s mission to render patent law more unified,
consistent, and predictable. In its recent patent decisions, however, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected formalistic rules in favor of holistic
standards.66 For example, the Court held that the Federal Circuit’s rule-like
“machine-or-transformation” test67 did not categorically govern the patent
eligibility of processes; rather, the Court invigorated the more holistic standard that abstract ideas are not patentable subject matter.68 The Court also
adopted a standard-like “flexible bar” approach to prosecution history estoppel,69 a doctrine that constrains patentees’ assertions of the doctrine of
equivalents.70 The Court also rejected the Federal Circuit’s rule-based
approach to nonobviousness,71 instead establishing a more “functional,”
63. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (affirming that
validity challenges to granted patents must be proven by clear and convincing evidence);
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068–72 (2011) (holding that willful
blindness can satisfy the mental state requirement for induced infringement); Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733–41 (2002) (adopting a flexible-bar
approach to prosecution history estoppel, thus favoring patentees); see also Holbrook, supra
note 11, at 76 (noting several cases where “the Supreme Court has been pro-patent”).
64. Commenting on a case that ultimately was not reviewed on the merits, Justice Breyer
tellingly noted that “sometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than ‘promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’ ” Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc.,
548 U.S. 124, 126 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari) (emphasis omitted) (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
65. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim Construction, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 123, 126 (2005); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme
Court’s Complicity in Federal Circuit Formalism, 20 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech.
L.J. 1, 2 (2003); Rai, supra note 49, at 1040; John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit,
52 Am. U. L. Rev. 771 (2003); see also Taylor, supra note 12, at 420 n.16 (collecting sources).
66. Lee, supra note 12, at 46–62; see also Richard Linn, Changing Times: Changing Demands, 15 SMU Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 1, 7 (2011) (“For the Supreme Court, bright-line rules
are seldom endorsed.”); Taylor, supra note 12, at 440.
67. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d on other grounds sub
nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
68. See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 602–04, 609–12; see also Lee, supra note 12, at 61–62.
69. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 737–41 (2002);
see Lee, supra note 12, at 47–51.
70. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 30–34 (1997)
(describing prosecution history estoppel as “a legal limitation on the doctrine of equivalents”).
71. See In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 998–99 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (articulating the Federal
Circuit’s “suggestion, teaching, or motivation” test for determining nonobviousness).
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“expansive and flexible” approach to such inquiries.72 In the remedies context, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s syllogistic rule that heavily favored granting injunctions and instead established a four-factor equitable
test to determine the appropriateness of such relief.73
Commentators have theorized that the Court’s preference for holistic
standards relates to its status as a generalist court. Among other implications, the Federal Circuit’s bright-line rules tend to ease the administration
of patent law by district courts74 and the PTO,75 in part by decreasing the
need to deeply engage with the details of complex technologies. As a generalist court with very few patent cases on its docket, however, the Supreme
Court is insulated from the day-to-day challenges of adjudicating technical
patent disputes. As such, “the Court is free to announce broad, policy-oriented standards without considering the difficulties of applying them in
myriad technological contexts.”76 The Supreme Court’s perch at the top of a
vast judicial hierarchy also affords it a perspective that a more specialized
court such as the Federal Circuit lacks. The Supreme Court’s holistic, “big
picture” perspective encourages it to consider how patents fit into the larger
economy77 and may inform its preference for holistic standards that consider
factual details and context. These prevailing theories of Supreme Court patent jurisprudence—reining in patent rights and favoring holistic standards—provide a backdrop for understanding the Court’s broad
“assimilation” of patent law, a topic that the next Part examines in depth.
III. The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law
This Article augments prevailing theories by arguing that the Supreme
Court’s recent jurisprudence also reflects an effort to eliminate patent “exceptionalism” and assimilate patent law to transcendent legal principles. At
times, this effort operates substantively, and at times it operates rhetorically,
framing new doctrine within the language of legal assimilation. Notably, this
interpretive theory encompasses not only the most recent Supreme Court
patent decisions, but also decisions dating back to the establishment of the
Federal Circuit.
72. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (citing Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12, 18 (1966)); see also Lee, supra note 12, at 51–56.
73. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Lee, supra note 12, at 56–59.
74. Lee, supra note 12, at 25–42; cf. Rai, supra note 49, at 1037 (arguing that the Federal
Circuit’s adoption of formalist, bright-line rules reduces the need for district court judges to
engage with technically complex subject matter).
75. Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)certainty, Legal Process, and Patent Law, 43 Loy. L.A.
L. Rev. 1109, 1126–28 (2010).
76. Lee, supra note 12, at 63.
77. Id. at 79; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the
Supreme Court—and Vice Versa, 59 Am. U. L. Rev. 787, 795 (2010) (“[The Federal Circuit] has
little chance to see how patents fit into the economy as a whole. The Supreme Court does have
that perspective.”).
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In providing a comprehensive theory of assimilation, this Article builds
on previous work recognizing pockets of patent exceptionalism (and the Supreme Court’s response to such exceptionalism) in specific contexts.78 For
example, Paul Gugliuzza notes the Supreme Court’s rejection of Federal Circuit patent exceptionalism in standing, remedies, and review of administrative agencies.79 Similarly, Rochelle Dreyfuss cites remedies, standing, and the
treatment of tying arrangements to observe that “the Supreme Court has
made smallish doctrinal adjustments intended to keep patent law in the
mainstream.”80 Tim Holbrook cites brief examples in remedies, declaratory
actions, induced infringement, and the extraterritorial application of patent
law to argue that the Supreme Court’s recent patent jurisprudence seeks “to
bring patent law back into the legal tapestry, rejecting any form of patent
exceptionalism.”81 In the pharmaceutical realm, Scott Hemphill argues that
the regulatory scheme of the Hatch-Waxman Act justifies some deviation
from traditional patent principles,82 while Robin Feldman argues against an
“exceptional” conception of patents as strict rights to exclude that trump
antitrust concerns.83
Federal Circuit judges have also recognized the Supreme Court’s wariness of patent exceptionalism. Judge O’Malley notes that the Supreme Court
has made it “abundantly clear that neither the character of patent law nor
the unusual character of our jurisdiction permits us to don a policy-making
mantle or to create special rules for patent cases.”84 Furthermore, Supreme
Court cases dealing with injunctions, standing, and nonobviousness “all
contain unmistakable language and straightforward holdings reminding us
that the Federal Circuit is an Article III court whose work is governed by the
same rules of procedure and evidence, and the same restrictions on its interpretative function, that govern all other courts in this country.”85 Similarly,
Judge Linn recognizes that the Supreme Court “is giving us guidance that
promoting uniformity in patent decisions does not mean creating patent78. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 12, at 77–78.
79. Gugliuzza, supra note 12, at 1817–18.
80. Dreyfuss, supra note 77, at 795.
81. Holbrook, supra note 11, at 71–72.
82. Hemphill, supra note 12, at 1561.
83. Feldman, supra note 12, at 67; see id. at 69. David Taylor focuses on a different kind
of “exceptionalism”: patent law’s exceptional need for certainty in defining property rights,
which helps justify bright-line rules. Taylor, supra note 12, at 473–80. But see Oskar Liivak,
Maturing Patent Theory from Industrial Policy to Intellectual Property, 86 Tul. L. Rev. 1163,
1169–73 (2012) (criticizing the “exceptional” deviation of patent law—as manifested in strong
exclusive rights—from modern conceptions of property).
84. Kathleen M. O’Malley, An Expanded “Slim Volume” on the Limited Role of Courts in
Shaping Patent Policy, 22 Fed. Cir. B.J. 91, 98 (2012) [hereinafter Limited Role of Courts]; see
also Kathleen M. O’Malley, The Intensifying National Interest in Patent Litigation, 19 Marq.
Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 1, 10 (2015) [hereinafter National Interest] (“[T]he Supreme Court has
been telling the Federal Circuit that, as an Article III court, it is bound by the same civil rules,
jurisdictional standards, and common law principles that govern all Article III courts . . . .”).
85. O’Malley, Limited Role of Courts, supra note 84, at 99.
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specific, bright-line rules outside the mainstream of federal law.”86 Furthermore, “a consistent theme of the Court’s opinions is the continual endorsement of past Supreme Court patent opinions and condemnation of patentspecific, bright-line rules in favor of flexible mainstream dogma.”87
This Part moves beyond these previous accounts to delve deeper into the
Supreme Court’s assimilation of patent law. In presenting a comprehensive
account of assimilation, it reveals how the Court’s project has taken a variety
of forms—some substantive, some rhetorical—across a wide variety of doctrinal areas. First, the Court has rejected special rules for patent law in favor
of broad structural regimes such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
APA, and jurisdictional statutes. Second, it has (somewhat imprecisely) invoked equitable principles to eliminate specialized rules for patent suits.
Third, the Court has reasoned by analogy from legal fields unrelated to patent law, borrowing concepts from other areas to inform patent doctrine.
Fourth, the Court has favored general, ordinary connotations of legal terms
instead of technical meanings specially adapted for patent law. Finally, the
Court has eliminated per se rules regarding the antitrust implications of
patents, subsuming such considerations within general antitrust principles.
Throughout, the Court has consistently characterized its rulings as assimilating patent law to broader legal norms and eliminating doctrinal
exceptionalism.
A. Enforcing Trans-Substantive Regulatory Schemes and Maintaining
Structural Relationships
1. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Appellate Review of District
Court Factual Findings
In an early case, the Supreme Court assimilated patent doctrine to a
general regulatory scheme, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to define
the standard of review between district and appellate courts. In the 1986
case of Dennison Manufacturing Co. v. Panduit Corp.,88 the Supreme Court
considered the appropriate standard of review of district court factual findings by the Federal Circuit. This infringement suit hinged on the nonobviousness requirement,89 which the Supreme Court had previously held is a
legal issue informed by several factual inquiries.90 In this case, the district
86. Linn, supra note 66, at 6.
87. Id.; see also S. Jay Plager, The Price of Popularity: The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit 2007, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 751, 755 (2007) (“One type of case that draws Supreme Court
attention is one in which the Circuit strays from generally applicable rules governing litigation
in favor of special rules for patent cases.”).
88. 475 U.S. 809 (1986) (per curiam).
89. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (“A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained
. . . if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed
invention as a whole would have been obvious . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art
to which the claimed invention pertains.”).
90. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
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court had examined the prior art, identified differences between the prior
art and the claims at issue, and concluded that the patents were invalid as
obvious.91 On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s conclusion regarding obviousness.92 In so doing, it disagreed with the district
court’s assessment of the prior art and ruled that the references cited by that
court did not suggest creating the patentee’s inventions.93 In reviewing the
district court, the Federal Circuit did not mention or explicitly apply a
clearly erroneous standard when rejecting the lower court’s factual findings,94 which would have been consistent with prevailing standards of appellate deference as embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.95
Implicitly, the Federal Circuit applied a less deferential standard when reviewing the lower court’s findings, perhaps informed by its own expertise in
patent adjudication.96
On appeal, in Dennison v. Panduit, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Federal Circuit’s judgment. The Supreme Court ruled that the
Federal Circuit’s review of district court factual determinations was subject
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6), which states that an appellate
court may only set aside factual findings if it finds them clearly erroneous.97
Notably, the Supreme Court’s opinion explicitly aimed to unify patent law
with prevailing rules of civil procedure.98 The Court did not consider the
unique attributes of the Federal Circuit, a quasi-specialized appellate court
with patent expertise, in determining the appropriate standard of review.99
Rather, the Court held (or even assumed) that Rule 52(a)(6) should govern
Federal Circuit review of district court factual findings, just as with any
other appellate court reviewing such findings.100 In so doing, the Supreme
Court not only constrained the Federal Circuit’s review of district court factual findings, it also constrained the Federal Circuit’s ability to interpret
91. Dennison Mfg., 475 U.S. at 809–10.
92. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1100 (Fed. Cir. 1985), vacated,
475 U.S. 809 (1986).
93. Id. at 1093–96.
94. Dennison Mfg., 475 U.S. at 811.
95. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6).
96. This non-deferential orientation may have been a legacy of the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (CCPA), one of the precursor courts to the Federal Circuit. Judge Giles
Rich, who served on the CCPA before becoming the first chief judge of the Federal Circuit,
once stated, “In the CCPA, we were not reviewing trials, and Rule 52(a) was not applicable. Or
if it was, we ignored it.” Giles S. Rich, Thirty Years of This Judging Business, 14 AIPLA Q.J. 139,
149 (1986).
97. Fed. Rule Civ. P. 52(a)(6); Dennison Mfg., 475 U.S. at 811.
98. See id. (“[W]hether or not the ultimate question of obviousness is a question of fact
subject to Rule 52(a), the subsidiary determinations of the District Court, at the least, ought to
be subject to the Rule.”).
99. Dreyfuss, supra note 49, at 52, 61.
100. Id. at 51–52.
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general rules—such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—in an exceptional manner for patent cases.101
Almost thirty years later, the Supreme Court once again confronted the
Federal Circuit’s review of district court factual findings, and the Court
again assimilated patent law to general legal principles. In 2015, in Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA v. Sandoz, Inc., the Supreme Court considered the appropriate standard of review for district court claim construction.102 District
courts perform claim construction to construe the meaning of key terms in
patent claims, and it often determines the outcome of patent litigation. In
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., the Supreme Court had held that
judges rather that juries should construe claims.103 However, the Court’s
opinion did not determine whether claim construction is a question of law
or fact or the appropriate standard of review for claim construction on appeal.104 Amidst significant controversy, the Federal Circuit held in a series of
rulings that claim construction should be considered a question of law that
is reviewed de novo.105 These rulings spawned significant debate, as several
members of the Federal Circuit indicated that claim construction, which
often involves hearing expert testimony and consulting outside treatises, involves factual determinations that warrant more deference on appeal.106
In addition to being conceptually problematic, de novo review was
troublesome because it exacerbated the uncertainty, length, and expense of
patent litigation, particularly given high (though declining) reversal rates107
101. Id. at 52. Interestingly, upon remand, the Federal Circuit reinstated its prior ruling,
though it did so expressly grounded in Rule 52(a)(6). See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co.,
810 F.2d 1561, 1565–82 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Gregory A. Castanias et al., Survey of the Federal
Circuit’s Patent Law Decisions in 2006: A New Chapter in the Ongoing Dialogue with the Supreme Court, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 793, 799 (2007). Rochelle Dreyfuss contends that the Federal
Circuit pushed back against the Supreme Court’s emphasis on deference by creating rules to
govern factual questions underlying legal issues (for example, in the case of nonobviousness)
as well as classifying more technical issues as questions of law instead of fact. Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 787, 802–03 (2008); Dreyfuss, supra note 77, at 797–98.
102. 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015).
103. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
104. Markman, 517 U.S. at 378 (characterizing claim construction as neither a purely legal
nor factual question but a “mongrel practice”).
105. Rai, supra note 49, at 1058; see, e.g., Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N.
Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1276–77 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015);
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
106. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(Mayer, J., dissenting) (“While this court may persist in the delusion that claim construction is
a purely legal determination, unaffected by underlying facts, it is plainly not the case.”); J.
Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative
Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 Nw. L. Rev. 1, 22–23 (2014) (noting that the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Markman “masked the inherent factual nature of claim
construction”).
107. See Anderson & Menell, supra note 106, at 39–41 (finding that reversal rates of claim
construction fell after the Federal Circuit’s 2005 decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp. from 37.2%
to 24.0%).
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of claim constructions by the Federal Circuit.108 Although the Federal Circuit
extended greater informal deference to claim constructions following the
clarification of claim interpretation methodologies in 2005,109 as a matter of
positive doctrine, the court continued to embrace de novo review.
In a 2014 en banc opinion, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed de novo review of claim construction in Lighting Ballast Control L.L.C. v. Philips Electronics North America Corp.110 Because this opinion provides a vivid contrast
to the Supreme Court’s subsequent treatment of claim construction, some
extended description is helpful. In large part, the Federal Circuit’s endorsement of de novo review arose from a deep appreciation of the unique attributes of patent law. Although the opinion rested significantly on stare decisis,
the opinion also considered the unique dynamics of de novo review within
the patent system. Drawing on fifteen years of patent practice, the court
reasoned that de novo review would continue to provide “national uniformity, consistency, and finality to the meaning and scope of patent claims.”111
The Federal Circuit, considering issues internal to patent law, also found
little evidence that more deferential review would achieve more accurate
outcomes.112 Furthermore, the majority opinion extensively considered amicus briefs from Google, Amazon, Hewlett-Packard, Red Hat, Yahoo!, Cisco,
Dell, EMC, Intel, SAP, and the SAS Institute that supported de novo review.113 The Federal Circuit’s embrace of de novo review of claim construction was predicated on an intricate consideration of patent dynamics and
the uniqueness of claim construction within patent litigation.
In 2015, the controversy over appellate review of claim construction finally reached the Supreme Court. In Teva Pharmaceuticals USA v. Sandoz,
Inc., the Court held that appellate courts should review the factual findings
that underlie a district court’s claim construction for clear error, vacating
the Federal Circuit’s judgment and remanding the case.114 Although the
Court characterized the ultimate issue of claim construction as a question of
law,115 it rejected de novo review of the factual underpinnings of that issue.116 Central to the Court’s decision was a distinction between two types of
evidence used in claim construction: intrinsic evidence (information “internal” to the patent, such as the specification, claims, and prosecution history)
108. Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1476–78 (Rader, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part); see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in Specialization, 54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 769, 785 (2004).
109. Anderson & Menell, supra note 106, at 61; see Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303.
110. 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015).
111. Lighting Ballast, 744 F.3d at 1277.
112. Id. at 1284.
113. Id. at 1286–88.
114. 135 S. Ct. 831, 842–83 (2015).
115. Teva Pharm., 135 S. Ct. at 837; see Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S.
370, 388–91 (1996).
116. This holding bears similarity to the “hybrid” standard advocated by Anderson and
Menell. See Anderson & Menell, supra note 106, at 73–76.
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and extrinsic evidence (external information such as expert testimony, dictionaries, and scientific treatises).117 The Supreme Court held that when
courts construe claims based solely on intrinsic evidence, the resulting construction is a legal determination subject to de novo review.118 However,
when courts consult extrinsic evidence and make subsidiary factual findings,
those findings must be reviewed for clear error.119
Notably, the Court rested its opinion solidly on conforming patent law
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6).120 The Court’s assimilationist
objective was quite explicit: it cited precedent (unrelated to patent law) indicating that this Rule creates a “clear command”121 that factual questions are
reviewed for clear error and that “[i]t does not make exceptions or purport
to exclude certain categories of factual findings from the obligation of a
court of appeals to accept a district court’s findings unless clearly erroneous.”122 The Court even delved into the history of the Rules Advisory Committee, which warned that exceptions to this general scheme “would tend to
undermine the legitimacy of the district courts.”123 In a stark contrast to the
Federal Circuit’s earlier resolution of Lighting Ballast, the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Teva largely avoids specialized considerations “internal” to patent
law. While the opinion notes that “practical considerations” favor clear error
review of factual components,124 its discussion of the dynamics of patent law
is much sparser than that of the Federal Circuit. Certainly, there is no
lengthy engagement with amicus briefs from technology companies. Its primary prerogative is to conform patent law to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As with its decision in Dennison three decades earlier, the Supreme
Court sidestepped the uniqueness and technicality of patent law and sought
to assimilate it to a general regulatory scheme.
2. The APA and Appellate Review of PTO Factual Findings
The Supreme Court’s assimilation of patent law extends beyond appellate review of district courts to another structural concern: appellate review
of the PTO. In patent practice, if the PTO rejects an application, the applicant may (following the appropriate administrative proceedings) appeal to
the Federal Circuit. In the 1998 case of In re Zurko, the Federal Circuit held
that the appropriate standard of review for PTO factual findings was the
clearly erroneous standard typical of district court–appellate court relations
117. Teva Pharm., 135 S. Ct. at 840–41; see Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1311–19
(reflecting previous use of the same distinction by the Federal Circuit).
118. Teva Pharm., 135 S. Ct. at 841.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 836; see Randy Lipsitz et al., Supreme Court Takes Another Bite Out of Federal
Circuit Exceptionalism, 27 Intell. Prop. & Tech. L.J. 18, 18 (2015).
121. Teva Pharm., 135 S. Ct. at 836 (citing Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574
(1985)).
122. Id. at 837 (quoting Pullman-Standard, Inc. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982)).
123. Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) advisory committee’s note to 1985 amendment).
124. Id. at 838.

1432

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 114:1413

rather than the more deferential substantial evidence standard for reviewing
formal agency proceedings under the APA.125 Essentially, the Federal Circuit
“denied that it is subject to the APA standard”126 and allowed itself more
leeway to review the PTO’s factual findings “on [its] own reasoning” rather
than the agency’s reasoning.127 In so doing, the court may have been motivated by a perception that, unlike traditional court-agency relations, deference to the PTO was not as justified because of the Federal Circuit’s own
expertise.128
Although the Federal Circuit acknowledged that Congress intended the
APA to apply to agencies generally, it recognized an exception for patent law.
In so ruling, the Federal Circuit invoked section 559 of the APA, an “exceptions” provision stating that the APA’s judicial review provisions were not
intended “to limit or repeal additional requirements . . . recognized by law”
at the time of the APA’s enactment.129 The Federal Circuit reasoned that
there was an “additional requirement” applicable to Patent Office review at
the time of the APA’s enactment—namely the less deferential clear error
standard—that qualified for the exemption.130 The court thus concluded
that then-existing common law standards and the peculiarities of patent
practice meant that “Congress did not intend the APA to alter the review of
substantive Patent Office decisions.”131 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit
cited over a century of courts reviewing Patent Office and PTO factual findings on a standard more closely approximating clear error than substantial
evidence.132 Relying on precedent and policy, the Federal Circuit ruled that
the APA’s general standard of review for agency factual findings did not
apply to its review of the PTO.133
125. 142 F.3d 1447, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc), rev’d by Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S.
150 (1999).
126. Rai, supra note 49, at 1052; see also Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s
Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 Geo. L.J.
269, 285–86 (2007) (explaining the Zurko court’s reasoning); Gugliuzza, supra note 12, at 1821
(same).
127. See Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1458.
128. Taylor, supra note 12, at 444; see Ronald Zibelli & Steven D. Glazer, An Interview
with Circuit Judge S. Jay Plager, J. Proprietary Rts., Dec. 1993, at 2, 5 (“I thought the PTO
was an administrative agency. But we don’t review it as if it is.”) (statement of Judge S. Jay
Plager).
129. Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1449; see 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012).
130. Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1452; see also Kumar, supra note 33, at 261 (critiquing the Federal
Circuit’s reasoning).
131. Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1452. Congress changed the name of the Patent Office to the
Patent and Trademark Office in 1975. Act of January 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-596, §1, 88 Stat.
1949 (1975).
132. Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1455.
133. David O. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law Adjudication: Precedent
and Policy, 66 SMU L. Rev. 633, 660–61 (2013). In part, the Federal Circuit’s less deferential
stance toward the PTO was a legacy of the CCPA. During Judge Rich’s tenure on the CCPA,
the court sought to exercise greater control over the PTO, in part by not applying traditional
principles of administrative law. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Constitution of Patent Law: The Court of
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On appeal, however, the Supreme Court rejected such patent exceptionalism and imposed the APA’s standard of review onto the Federal Circuit.134
In Dickinson v. Zurko, the Court reversed the Federal Circuit, holding that
the appropriate standard of review of PTO factual findings is the substantial
evidence standard of the APA.135 The Court emphasized the value of legal
universality and consistency, “[r]ecognizing the importance of maintaining a
uniform approach to judicial review of administrative action.”136 According
to Sarah Tran, “The Court was particularly perturbed by the Federal Circuit’s brazenness in creating an administrative law anomaly.”137 The Court
considered eighty-nine pre-APA cases involving Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) review of Patent Office decisions and found that they
did not establish a less deferential standard typical of district court–appellate
court relations for reviewing agency factual findings.138 Furthermore, many
of these cases cited the Patent Office’s expertise as counseling for more deferential review, a sentiment formalized in the APA.139 The Court concluded
that appellate review of PTO fact findings did not entail an “additional requiremen[t] . . . recognized at law” at the time of the APA’s enactment.140
Based on policy and precedent,141 the Court held that the APA standard applied to appellate review of PTO factual findings. Indeed, the Court chided
the Federal Circuit for “believing that the PTO was somehow different from
other administrative agencies in the executive branch.”142
Customs and Patent Appeals and the Shape of the Federal Circuit’s Jurisprudence, 43 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 843, 852 (2010); Rich, supra note 96, at 149 (“Reviewing the PTO Boards, our attitude
was we reversed them if they were wrong. In that regard, we did not act like the Circuit Courts
of Appeal.”). As noted, Judge Rich subsequently became one of the first judges on the Federal
Circuit, and he and other former judges of the CCPA and the Court of Claims helped carry
forward this less deferential orientation to the new court. Kumar, supra note 33, at 242.
134. Cf. Dreyfuss, supra note 108, at 793 (“Until quite recently, it was not even clear that
[the PTO] was an agency within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act . . . .”).
135. 527 U.S. 150, 150 (1999).
136. Zurko, 527 U.S. at 154; see also id. at 155 (“The APA was meant to bring uniformity
to a field full of variation and diversity.”); Benjamin & Rai, supra note 126, at 270; Rai, supra
note 49, at 1054 (“In Zurko . . . the Supreme Court held that the highly deferential APA
standard of review squarely applied to all Federal Circuit review of PTO fact finding.”); Sarah
Tran, Administrative Law, Patents, and Distorted Rules, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 831, 835 (2012)
(“The [Supreme Court in Zurko] illuminated the PTO’s right to be reviewed under standard
administrative law principles, including those set out in the APA, and stressed the importance
of applying administrative law uniformly, without a carve-out for patent law.”).
137. Tran, supra note 136, at 867.
138. Zurko, 527 U.S. at 155.
139. Id. at 160–61.
140. Id. at 161 (alteration in original) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012)).
141. Id. at 160–61; Taylor, supra note 133, at 667.
142. Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 Wm. & Mary. L.
Rev. 127, 173–74 (2000); see Zurko, 527 U.S. at 154–55. Notably, even after Zurko, the Federal
Circuit continued to push against deferential review of the PTO. Zurko did not specify if the
appropriate APA standard to apply to the PTO was “substantial evidence” (for formal proceedings) or “arbitrary or capricious” (for informal proceedings). Gugliuzza, supra note 12, at
1821. Although the difference is slight, the Federal Circuit has selected the substantial evidence
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The Supreme Court’s assimilationist drive in Zurko is particularly noteworthy given persuasive authority that Congress did not intend the APA to
govern appellate review of PTO fact-finding. This view is best illustrated in
In re Lueders,143 a 1997 Federal Circuit case which Zurko implicitly overruled.
In Lueders, the Federal Circuit reversed several PTO findings regarding nonobviousness.144 In so doing, it utilized the clearly erroneous standard to review the PTO’s factual findings rather than the more deferential substantial
evidence or arbitrary and capricious standards of the APA.145 In justifying its
less deferential standard of review, the Federal Circuit noted the CCPA’s
long practice of reviewing PTO factual findings under the clearly erroneous
standard.146 More compellingly, it also cited a 1947 Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act authored by then-Attorney General Tom Clark.147 The
Manual explicitly stated that the operative provision of the APA, 5 U.S.C.
§ 704, did not apply to appellate review of PTO factual findings.148 Combined with the longstanding history of the Federal Circuit and its predecessors, this historical evidence provides a compelling rationale for not
extending enhanced deference to the PTO.149 However, the Supreme Court
did not address this argument for patent exceptionalism in Zurko; instead, it
brought patent law squarely within the APA’s fold.150 There, the Court subsumed patent law within a general trend of extreme skepticism toward exceptions to the APA.151 As with appellate review of district court factstandard, which is generally perceived as less deferential. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305,
1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Gugliuzza, supra note 12, at 1821–22; Kumar, supra note 33, at
263–64; Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1965, 1977–78 (2009); Rai, supra note 49, at 1055–56; see In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1381
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
143. 111 F.3d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
144. Lueders, 111 F.3d at 1574.
145. Id. at 1574–75.
146. Id. at 1575.
147. Id.
148. Clark, supra note 33, at 101 (“Furthermore, this provision does not provide additional judicial remedies in situations where the Congress has provided special and adequate
review procedures. . . . Thus, the Customs Court and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals retain their present exclusive jurisdictions.”); see also Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 102
n.22 (1981) (extending deference to the letters and statements of Attorney General Clark regarding the APA); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 546 (1978) (same).
149. See Long, supra note 142, at 1976 (“Early drafts of the APA explicitly exempted the
PTO from the APA’s purview.”).
150. Id. at 1977 (“The Court came out against anti-PTO exceptionalism . . . .”).
151. See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713
(2011) (declining to create a special rule of administrative review only applicable to tax disputes); Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dep’t of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512
U.S. 267, 271 (1994); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950); cf. Antonin Scalia,
Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 345,
358 (noting the Supreme Court’s resistance to efforts by the D.C. Circuit (a kind of quasi-
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finding, the unique features of patent law—including a quasi-specialized appellate court—did not justify departing from general norms of appellate review of agency fact-finding.
3. Jurisdiction over Patent Matters
The Supreme Court’s assimilationist project extends to another important structural consideration: jurisdiction. It has long been accepted that the
Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over an appeal where the complaint pleads at
least one patent issue.152 In 2002, however, in Holmes Group., Inc. v. Vornado
Air Circulation Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction over an appeal where the only
patent issue arose from the defendant’s counterclaim rather than the plaintiff’s complaint.153 In this litigation, the Federal Circuit had recognized jurisdiction, vacated the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case.154 On
appeal, however, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the
Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction.155 In so doing, the Court applied the
traditional well-pleaded-complaint rule governing whether a case “arises
under” patent law for purposes of conferring jurisdiction on a district court,
which is a predicate for appellate jurisdiction by the Federal Circuit.156 Applying the well-pleaded-complaint rule, the Court concluded that an issue
only “arises under” patent law if it “appears in the plaintiff’s statement of his
own claim in the bill or declaration.”157 Because this was not the case, the
Court ruled that the Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
Significantly, the Court rejected deviating from its conception of the
well-pleaded-complaint rule based on the uniqueness of patent law or the
specialized court in the administrative law context) to graft additional procedural requirements onto the APA). But see John M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit: Comparative Trials of Two Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 553, 553 (2010)
(“Supreme Court intervention does not necessarily prevent a semi-specialized circuit from
putting a strong stamp on an area of relative expertise . . . .”).
152. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012).
153. 535 U.S. 826 (2002). In an earlier case addressing the well-pleaded-complaint rule,
the Court had stated, in dicta, that “a case raising a federal patent-law defense does not, for
that reason alone, ‘arise under’ patent law.” Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486
U.S. 800, 809 (1988) (emphasis added) (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation
Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 14 (1983)).
154. Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 13 F. App’x 961 (Fed. Cir.
2001), vacated, 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
155. Holmes Group, 535 U.S. at 834.
156. Id. at 831; see 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal
Circuit over “an appeal from a final decision of a district court . . . if the jurisdiction of that
court was based, in whole or in part, on [28 U.S.C. §] 1338”); id. § 1338(a) (“The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress
relating to patents . . . .”); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
157. Holmes Group, 535 U.S. at 830 (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.,
486 U.S. 800, 809 (1988)).
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Federal Circuit. Respondent argued that Congress’s goal of promoting uniformity within patent law weighed in favor of allowing the Federal Circuit to
have jurisdiction over all appeals involving patent issues, regardless of
whether those issues arose in a complaint or counterclaim.158 This is a fairly
plausible argument given that patent law rulings from the regional courts of
appeal (based on patent issues raised only by defendants) might clash with
doctrine emanating from the Federal Circuit.159 However, the Supreme
Court rejected this argument, elevating the text of jurisdictional statutes and
related doctrine above any speculation into Congress’s intent regarding Federal Circuit jurisdiction.160 Hewing close to the traditional well-pleadedcomplaint rule and rejecting any patent exceptionalism, the Court held that
the Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction when a patent issue only arose in the
defendant’s counterclaim. In so doing, the Court not only assimilated patent
law to more general jurisdictional canons, it also constrained the power of
the Federal Circuit.
Notably, Congress statutorily overruled Holmes Group in the 2011
America Invents Act, which extends jurisdiction over patent appeals to the
Federal Circuit when a patent issue arises in a compulsory counterclaim.161
Illustrating a theme to which this Article will return, this development demonstrates that the Supreme Court does not necessarily have the last word
when it comes to patent assimilation. Though the Court appears to value
assimilation significantly, Congress can legislate patent exceptionalism when
it feels such action is warranted.162
More recently, the Supreme Court has continued to reject special consideration of patent interests in other areas of jurisdictional law. While
Holmes Group addressed the Federal Circuit’s authority to hear patent disputes relative to regional federal appellate courts, another important jurisdictional issue deals with the circumstances under which a state law claim
involving a patent can give rise to federal jurisdiction. Under the wellpleaded-complaint rule, cases involving only state law claims can still “arise
under” federal law—and thus confer jurisdiction to federal courts—if the

158. See id. at 831.
159. Cf. id. at 839–40 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding that when a
compulsory counterclaim “aris[es] under” patent law and is adjudicated on the merits, the
Federal Circuit enjoys exclusive appellate jurisdiction (alteration in original) (quoting AerojetGen. Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd., 895 F.2d 736, 741–44 (Fed. Cir.
1990))).
160. See id. at 833–34 (“Our task here is not to determine what would further Congress’s
goal of ensuring patent-law uniformity, but to determine what the words of the statute must
fairly be understood to mean.”). The Court rejected a similar argument in Christianson v. Colt
Indus. Operating Corp. See 486 U.S. 800, 813–14 (1988).
161. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 19(a), 125 Stat. 284, 331
(2011).
162. See infra notes 372–374 and accompanying text.
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complaint raises “[a] significant federal issue[ ].”163 Longstanding doctrine
holds that “to justify federal jurisdiction, the federal issue should have wider
importance than the case at hand.”164 This is a difficult area of law with few
clear guideposts, and in a series of cases, the Federal Circuit took a relatively
broad view of federal “arising under” jurisdiction for cases involving state
law allegations of patent malpractice. In a pair of cases, the Federal Circuit
held that federal jurisdiction existed where resolution of a malpractice claim
required adjudicating the merits of an infringement claim165 or determining
the scope of a patent claim.166 This is a rather expansive concept of “arising
under” jurisdiction, and the Federal Circuit justified it in part on an understanding that Congress intended to unify patent law and make it more predictable.167 The Federal Circuit reasoned that federal courts’ experience in
claim construction and infringement matters counseled in favor of federal
jurisdiction.168 Furthermore, Congress demonstrated its intent to “remove
non-uniformity in the patent law” by establishing the Federal Circuit, thus
providing further evidence that federal jurisdiction would be proper over
certain state law actions involving patents.169 In Air Measurement, the court
concluded that “Congress considered the federal-state division of labor and
struck a balance in favor of this court’s entertaining patent infringement.”170
In 2013, in Gunn v. Minton, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal
Circuit’s expansive conception of “arising under” jurisdiction and assimilated patent doctrine with its conception of prevailing jurisdictional
norms.171 In this case, the Texas Supreme Court, relying on Federal Circuit
precedent, dismissed a state malpractice case involving an allegation of patent malpractice because of lack of jurisdiction.172 On appeal, the Supreme
Court reversed, holding that “state legal malpractice claims based on underlying patent matters will rarely, if ever, arise under federal patent law.”173 In
163. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005);
see also Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 700–01 (2006) (rejecting federal jurisdiction because the state law claim at issue was “fact-bound and situationspecific”).
164. Gugliuzza, supra note 12, at 1807.
165. Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 504 F.3d
1262, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
166. Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281, 1283 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
167. Id. at 1285–86; Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1272; Grossi, supra note 35, at 1006;
Gugliuzza, supra note 12, at 1811.
168. Immunocept, 504 F.3d at 1285; Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1272; see Grable, 545
U.S. at 315.
169. Immunocept, 504 F.3d at 1285–86.
170. Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1272.
171. 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013). But see Grossi, supra note 35, at 1013–18 (criticizing the
holding in Gunn v. Minton as applying a mechanical test instead of reasoned analysis).
172. Minton v. Gunn, 355 S.W.3d 634, 641–42 (Tex. 2011), rev’d, Gunn v. Minton, 133 S.
Ct. 1059 (2013).
173. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1065.
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so doing, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s expansive conception of
“arising under” jurisdiction, which was predicated in part on the Federal
Circuit’s perceived need for national uniformity in patent affairs. As Paul
Gugliuzza observes, “The Supreme Court’s opinion in Gunn is an emphatic
rejection of the Federal Circuit’s position that practically all cases requiring
analysis of patent validity, enforceability, infringement, or scope are subject
to exclusive federal jurisdiction.”174 The Supreme Court eschewed the argument that Congress’s drive to unify patent law justified more expansive federal jurisdiction over patent malpractice claims and instead conformed this
area of patent doctrine to its conception of prevailing jurisdictional norms.
The implications of Gunn are significant, for it “applies to a full range of
federal question cases in which a federal issue is embedded in a state law
claim.”175
B. Applying Equitable Principles: Injunctive Relief
Legislative and quasi-legislative pronouncements, such as the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the APA, and jurisdictional statutes, are not the
only trans-substantive legal norms to which the Supreme Court has assimilated patent law. Indeed, the Supreme Court has also drawn upon equitable
principles to eliminate patent exceptionalism and, at least ostensibly, bring
patent law within the broader legal fold.
In rather curious fashion, equitable principles formed the basis for what
the Supreme Court understood as patent assimilation in an important 2006
case involving infringement remedies. In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
the Court clarified the standard for granting an injunction in patent infringement suits.176 Prior to this case, the Federal Circuit had developed a
“general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances.”177 On appeal, the Supreme
Court reversed, rejecting the Federal Circuit’s practice of virtually automatically granting injunctions to prevailing patentees.178 Citing “well-established
principles of equity,” the Court articulated a four-factor, equitable test to
govern the award of injunctions.179 The Court’s opinion exhibits a systematizing tone that repudiates any form of patent exceptionalism. It notes that
174. Gugliuzza, supra note 12, at 1814.
175. Grossi, supra note 35, at 962.
176. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
177. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated,
547 U.S. 388 (2006); see also W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (“This court has indicated that an injunction should issue once infringement has
been established unless there is a sufficient reason for denying it.”).
178. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
179. Id. (“A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2)
that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for
that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant,
a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a
permanent injunction.”).
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“[t]hese familiar principles apply with equal force to disputes arising under
the Patent Act,” and it cautions against “ ‘a major departure from the long
tradition of equity practice.’ ”180 Further reflecting its systemizing orientation, the Court observed that patent law’s intellectual property cousin, copyright law, also applies an equitable framework to determine the
appropriateness of injunctive relief.181
Among other implications, eBay illustrates the important rhetorical
value of assimilation to the Supreme Court, which used the language of assimilation to create a novel standard for injunctions. Although the Court
framed its holding in “traditional equitable principles,” commentators have
pointed out that the Court’s four-factor test actually departs from traditional injunction analysis in important ways.182 For instance, the test only
presents a limited set of traditional equitable concerns, duplicates similar
policy interests in considering irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal
remedies, does not present each component as a true “factor” to be considered in a holistic analysis, and arguably discourages the use of rebuttable
presumptions.183 Thus, this “traditional” test is quite novel and displaces
longstanding equitable practice. John Golden is more pointed in his criticism, noting that the test “appears to have been something of a hoax.”184 In a
sense, the Supreme Court replaced the Federal Circuit’s exceptional rule
with an exceptional one of its own creation, though one purportedly tied
more closely to traditional equitable principles.
In addition to representing an instance of rhetorical rather than substantive assimilation,185 eBay is also notable because it reverses the usual polarity: a rule developed for patent law has become the standard for
determining injunctions in a wide range of doctrinal areas, as opposed to
vice versa. Notwithstanding its perceived defects, courts have widely adopted
the eBay framework;186 within a few years, eBay has become “the test” that
federal courts apply to determine injunctive relief in cases spanning patent
law, other forms of intellectual property law, governmental regulation, constitutional law, and state tort and contract law.187 eBay illustrates that patent
assimilation can work in more than one direction; patent doctrine can export itself to other doctrinal areas rather than simply importing and adopting exogenous norms.
180. Id. (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 320 (1982)).
181. Id. 392–93.
182. Mark P. Gergen et al., The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 203, 207–08 (2012).
183. Id. at 207–08.
184. John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 657, 695 (2009).
185. See infra Section IV.B.5 for a discussion of how this use of “assimilation” to create
new doctrine differs from substantive patent assimilation.
186. Gergen et al., supra note 182, at 215–19.
187. Id. at 205.
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C. Analogizing from Other Areas of Law: Induced Infringement
As we have seen, the assimilation of patent law can take several forms,
including invoking transcendent regulatory schemes and equitable principles
to reshape patent doctrine. In some cases, assimilationist tendencies operate
at a subtler level by influencing the ways that courts reason through unfamiliar legal problems. For example, the Supreme Court’s desire for legal
universality and coherence can manifest itself in borrowing concepts from
nonpatent areas to illuminate patent doctrine. Such was the case in GlobalTech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.188 Here, some context is in order. Patent law
recognizes two forms of secondary liability: induced infringement, in which
the defendant “actively induces infringement of a patent”189 by another party
and contributory infringement, in which the defendant distributes a specialized component of a patented invention knowing that it is “especially made
or especially adapted for use in an infringement.”190 In Global-Tech, the
Court considered whether there is a mental state requirement for induced
infringement, and if so, what are its contours.191 Drawing primarily on commonalities with contributory infringement, which clearly possesses an intent
requirement,192 the Court held that induced infringement has a mental state
requirement as well.193 In an assimilationist move, the Court looked to
sources outside of patent law to corroborate its holding. According to the
Court, the established link between induced infringement and an intent requirement in copyright law provided support for a similar relationship in
patent law.194
Significantly, the Court ventured further afield and drew heavily on
criminal law to flesh out the mental state requirement for induced infringement under patent law. Drawing on a “well established” principle of criminal law, the Court held that “willful blindness” satisfies the intent
requirement of induced infringement.195 This choice seems rather peculiar,
particularly given that induced infringement is a civil rather than criminal
matter, and indeed there is no criminal liability for any type of patent infringement. The dissent even recognized this anomaly, observing that the
purposes of criminal law and patent law are very different.196 Nevertheless,
the majority states that “[g]iven the long history of willful blindness and its
188. 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011) (applying criminal law concepts to delineate the mental state
requirement for induced infringement).
189. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012).
190. Id. § 271(c); accord Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476,
485 (1964).
191. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. 2060.
192.
193.
194.
(2005)).
195.
196.

See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2066–67.
Id. (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913
Id. at 2068–69.
Id. at 2073 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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wide acceptance in the Federal Judiciary, we can see no reason why the doctrine should not apply in civil lawsuits for induced patent infringement
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).”197 Notably, such examination of legal areas beyond the civil context was absent from the Federal Circuit’s consideration of
the intent requirement for induced infringement in the proceedings
below.198
In the more recent case of Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc., the Court indicated that although such conceptual borrowing has
its limits, legal fields outside of patent law, such as criminal law, can suggest
answers to questions raised by patent doctrine.199 And even more recently, in
Commil USA, L.L.C. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., the Court analogized from contract, property, and criminal law to illustrate that belief in patent invalidity
does not eliminate liability for induced infringement.200 Such conceptual
borrowing and reasoning by analogy is characteristic of the Supreme Court’s
systemizing tendencies.
D. Eliminating Specialized Patent Rules in Favor of General Precedent
and Ordinary Meanings
The Supreme Court has also eliminated specialized patent rules in a
more straightforward fashion, conforming patent practice to general precedent and ordinary meanings of legal concepts. This phenomenon is evident
in several trans-substantive areas that implicate not just patent litigation but
litigation in general, such as the “actual controversy” requirement to bring a
suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act as well as the standard by which a
court will award attorney’s fees to a prevailing party.
1. The “Actual Controversy” Requirement
The Supreme Court’s assimilationist project extends to the “actual controversy” requirement to bring a suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act.201
This requirement plays an important role in a variety of patent cases, including declaratory actions where a licensee in good standing seeks to challenge
the validity of a patent that it is currently licensing. More specifically, courts
have grappled with whether such a licensee, who has not repudiated the
license, can satisfy the “actual controversy” requirement of the Declaratory

197. Id. at 2069.
198. See SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1375–78 (Fed. Cir. 2010),
aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).
199. See 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2119 (2014) (“While we have drawn on criminal law concepts in
the past in interpreting § 271(b), see Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., we think it
unlikely that Congress had this particular [aiding and abetting] doctrine in mind when it
enacted the Patent Act of 1952 . . . .” (citation omitted)).
200. See 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1930 (2015).
201. Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012).
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Judgment Act to confer jurisdiction on a court to adjudicate the case.202
After all, if the licensee continues to pay royalties and does not repudiate the
license, perhaps there is no actual controversy between the licensee and patentee. In a series of cases, the Federal Circuit developed a two-part “pragmatic inquiry” to determine the existence of an actual controversy for
purposes of bringing a declaratory judgment action:
There must be both (1) an explicit threat or other action by the patentee,
which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratory
judgment plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit, and (2) present
activity which could constitute infringement or concrete steps taken with
the intent to conduct such activity.203

This “reasonable apprehension” test was particularly salient when a licensee
maintained good standing (and continued to pay royalties) but sought to
challenge the validity of a licensed patent. In such circumstances, it was difficult for the licensee to establish a reasonable apprehension of suit on the
part of the patentee, thus failing to satisfy the actual controversy standard
and foreclosing a patent validity challenge.204 Indeed, Federal Circuit doctrine discouraged a licensee from “hedg[ing] its bet[s]” and compelled the
licensee to stop paying royalties if it wanted to challenge the patent.205
In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., the Supreme Court rejected the
Federal Circuit’s reasonable apprehension test in favor of broader precedent
concerning the actual controversy standard.206 At issue in this case was another instance where a licensee in good standing, MedImmune, sought to
challenge the validity of a patent it was licensing. Reversing the Federal Circuit, the Court held that a licensee could still satisfy the actual controversy
requirement without repudiating the license and ceasing to pay royalties,
thus conferring jurisdiction on a federal court to adjudicate the patent challenge.207 In so doing, the Court relied centrally on its own precedent rather
than that of the Federal Circuit.208 Furthermore, the Court explicitly emphasized that the Federal Circuit’s reasonable apprehension test conflicted with
202. Id.; see, e.g., Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(“The difference between an abstract question and a ‘controversy’ contemplated by the Declaratory Judgment Act is necessarily one of degree, and it would be difficult, if it would be
possible, to fashion a precise test for determining in every case whether there is such a controversy.” (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941))), abrogated by
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
203. Gen-Probe, 359 F.3d at 1380 (quoting BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d
975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993)); see Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1333
(2005) (adding the requirement of a “reasonable apprehension of imminent suit”), abrogated
by MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
204. Gen-Probe, 359 F.3d at 1380–82.
205. See id. at 1378, 1381.
206. 549 U.S. 118, 133–37 (2007).
207. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 137.
208. See id. at 130–31; see also Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359 (1943) (holding that a
licensee’s challenge to licensed patents remained justiciable even though the licensee continued
to pay royalties).
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settled Supreme Court doctrine regarding the actual controversy requirement.209 As a result, the Court not only made patents more vulnerable to
challenge, it eliminated a specialized patent rule in favor of more general
precedent.210
2. Attorney’s Fees
A pair of recent cases reflects the Supreme Court’s assimilation of patent
doctrine regarding the award of attorney’s fees. Attorney’s fees have attracted significant attention because they tend to be quite high in patent
litigation, and some see the award of attorney’s fees as a fruitful way to
discourage suits by nonpracticing entities (also known as patent trolls).211
The Patent Act authorizes district courts to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party “in exceptional cases.”212 The Federal Circuit had developed a
line of doctrine establishing only two limited circumstances where a case
could be deemed “exceptional”: (1) “when there has been some material
inappropriate conduct,” or (2) when the litigation is both “brought in subjective bad faith” and “objectively baseless.”213 In Icon Health & Fitness, Inc.
v. Octane Fitness, L.L.C., the Federal Circuit denied Octane’s request to “revisit the settled standard for exceptionality” and affirmed the district court’s
denial of attorney’s fees.214
On appeal, in Octane Fitness, L.L.C. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., the
Supreme Court explicitly rejected the Federal Circuit’s “unduly rigid”
framework for determining “exceptional” cases.215 Rather, it assimilated the
standard governing the award of attorney’s fees in patent cases to general
equitable principles. Rejecting the Federal Circuit’s two-part definition, the
Court construed the term “exceptional” according to its “ordinary meaning.”216 Doing so, the Court held that “an ‘exceptional’ case is simply one
209. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 132 n.11 (collecting cases); see Timothy R. Holbrook, The
Return of the Supreme Court to Patent Law, 1 Akron Intell. Prop. J. 1, 18 (2007); Kelly Casey
Mullally et al., MedImmune v. Genentech, 4 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 59, 71 (2009) (“The footnote
gets rid entirely of this ‘reasonable apprehension of imminent suit’ test.”) (statement of Gregory Castanias).
210. See Mullally et al., supra note 209, at 509 (“This case is very much a part of the trend
that we have noted, the trend away from any kind of patent law exceptionalism.”) (statement
of Professor Mullally).
211. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Litigation Reform: The Courts, Congress, and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 279, 286–87 (2015) (describing fee-shifting provisions
in several patent reform bills).
212. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012).
213. Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2005), abrogated by Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014);
see iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (clarifying that litigation is
objectively baseless if it is “so unreasonable that no reasonable litigant could believe it would
succeed”).
214. 496 F. App’x 57, 65 (Fed. Cir. 2012), rev’d by 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014).
215. 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1755 (2014).
216. Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756 (quoting Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886 (2013)).
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that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a
party’s litigating position . . . or the unreasonable manner in which the case
was litigated.”217 The Court also drew on the “comparable context of the
Copyright Act,” which also maintains a broader equitable test to determine
the award of attorney’s fees.218 Furthermore, the Court buttressed its holding
by situating patent law within more general legal principles: “We have long
recognized a common-law exception to the general ‘American rule’ against
fee-shifting—an exception, ‘inherent’ in the ‘power [of] the courts’ . . . .”219
Based in part on these transcendent principles, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s narrow, specialized rule for identifying “exceptional cases” for
the purpose of awarding attorney’s fees.220
The Supreme Court’s assimilationist project continued with its ruling
on the appropriate standard of review for a district court’s determination of
an “exceptional” case. The Supreme Court addressed this question in the
companion case of Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc.,
which it decided on the same day.221 In prior proceedings, the district court
had held that the case was “exceptional” and awarded attorney’s fees to
Highmark.222 On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed de novo the district
court’s determination that the case was “objectively baseless” and reversed in
part.223 Among other implications, the Federal Circuit’s standard of de novo
review provides it with significant power to determine the appropriateness
of awarding attorney’s fees.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit, rejecting de
novo review of elements of the “exceptional” case determination.224 Drawing
on its contemporaneous holding in Octane Fitness, the Court ruled that because “[d]istrict courts may determine whether a case is ‘exceptional’ in the
case-by-case exercise of their discretion,”225 such determinations were subject to review for abuse of discretion upon appeal.226 In so doing, the Court
invoked the traditional framework in which courts review questions of law
de novo, questions of fact for clear error, and discretionary matters for an
217. Id. at 1756.
218. Id. (citing Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994)).
219. Id. at 1758 (alteration in original) (quoting Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 258–59 (1975)).
220. The Court further reflected its universalizing ethos by drawing on “comparable feeshifting statutes” to require proof by a preponderance of the evidence, thus rejecting the Federal Circuit’s practice of requiring clear and convincing evidence to recover attorney’s fees. Id.
221. 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014).
222. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 713, 738–39 (N.D.
Tex. 2010), vacated, 557 F. App’x 995 (2014) (per curiam).
223. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 687 F.3d 1300, 1309 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (citing Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003,
1004–06 (Fed. Cir. 2012)), vacated, 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014).
224. Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1748.
225. Id. at 1756.
226. Highmark Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2014).
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abuse of discretion.227 Furthermore, the Court drew upon cases unrelated to
patent law to illustrate the notion that courts generally review discretionary
decisions for abuse of discretion.228 The Court thereby continued to eliminate exceptional patent rules in favor of more general legal principles.
E. Eliminating Presumptions and Per Se Rules at the Intersection of
Patent and Antitrust Law
The Supreme Court’s assimilation of patent doctrine also includes eliminating specialized presumptions and per se rules at the intersection of patent and antitrust law. This is fraught territory, for the Supreme Court has
observed on occasion that the presence of a patent in an antitrust dispute
may justify a deviation from traditional antitrust principles.229 The trend in
recent cases, however, is to deny the “specialness” of patents, subsuming
disputes involving patents within broader principles of antitrust analysis.
The Court has thus integrated patent law into its general shift away from per
se rules and toward greater use of antitrust law’s traditional rule of reason.230
This assimilationist shift is evident in two areas at the interface of patent and
antitrust law: tying arrangements and reverse payment settlements.
1. Tying Arrangements
The Supreme Court’s assimilation of patent doctrine is evident in its
evolving approach to tying arrangements. In general, a tying arrangement
(which does not necessarily involve a patent) arises when a party makes the
purchase of one good (the tied product) a mandatory condition for purchasing another good (the tying product).231 Such arrangements can arouse antitrust suspicions because the patentee may be leveraging market power in one
market to restrain competition in another.232 In its early antitrust jurisprudence, the Supreme Court regarded tying arrangements (including those
227. Id.
228. Id.; see Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990) (holding that
appellate courts should review sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 for abuse of
discretion; Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988) (holding that fee-shifting determinations under the Equal Access to Justice Act should be reviewed for abuse of discretion).
229. See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(“A patent carves out an exception to the applicability of antitrust laws.”); Simpson v. Union
Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964) (“The patent laws which give a . . . monopoly on ‘making,
using, or selling the invention’ are in pari materia with the antitrust laws and modify them pro
tanto.” (citing United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 485 (1926))); United States v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 488, 494 (1926) (holding that a patentee may agree to restrict prices in
a license with a competitor); see Hemphill, supra note 12, at 1600–01.
230. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007)
(rejecting a per se rule in favor of the rule of reason in the context of vertical minimum-price
fixing); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 18, 22 (1997) (rejecting a per se rule in favor of the
rule of reason in the context of vertical maximum-price fixing).
231. Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm,
52 Ariz. L. Rev. 925, 926 (2010).
232. See id. at 931.
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that did not involve patents) with deep skepticism, observing that “[t]ying
agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition.”233 Over the years, however, this skepticism decreased, and the Court
ultimately rejected a per se rule that all tying arrangements constitute antitrust violations. Rather, parties must make a showing of market power in a
tying arrangement in order to prevail on an antitrust claim.234
Tying arrangements involving a patented product, however, were somewhat specialized cases. In such tying arrangements, a patentee conditions the
sale of a patented product on a buyer also purchasing a second, “tied” product.235 To understand the legal implications of tying arrangements involving
patented products, one must consider the intersections and divergences of
patent and antitrust law. In early patent cases, the Supreme Court expressed
particular suspicion toward tying arrangements involving patents.236 That
skepticism became the basis for a judicially created patent misuse defense
(independent of any potential antitrust claim) when a patentee used its patent “as the effective means of restraining competition with its sale of an
unpatented article.”237 If an alleged infringer could establish that a patentee
was misusing its patent to restrain trade, a court could decline to enforce the
patent.238 In its patent doctrine, the Court developed a presumption that a
patent conferred market power, and this presumption ultimately migrated
from patent doctrine to the Court’s antitrust jurisprudence.239 In particular,
in the 1984 case of Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, the Supreme Court held that, as a matter of antitrust doctrine, “if the Government
has granted the seller a patent or similar patent monopoly over a product, it
is fair to presume that the inability to buy the product elsewhere gives the
seller market power.”240 Thus, for a while, patent doctrine and antitrust doctrine were unified in recognizing a presumption of market power in tying
arrangements involving patents. In 1988, however, Congress amended the
patent laws to eliminate the presumption of market power in the patent
misuse context.241 A divide thus emerged between two related bodies of law:
233. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305–06 (1949).
234. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 28–29 (1984), abrogated by
Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
235. See Hovenkamp, supra note 231, at 931.
236. E.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518–19
(1917).
237. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 490 (1942), abrogated by Ill. Tool
Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); see United States v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38,
46 (1962), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
238. See Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 493.
239. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 13–16 (1984); Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S.
392, 396 (1947) (holding that a patent tying arrangement violated section 1 of the Sherman
Act), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
240. 466 U.S. at 16 (citing Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. at 45–47) (emphasis added).
241. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2012).
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Congress eliminated the presumption of market power for tying arrangements in patent misuse claims, but courts continued to recognize this presumption of market power in antitrust claims involving patented items.242
In Independent Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works Inc., the Federal Circuit
addressed whether courts should continue to recognize a presumption of
market power in antitrust cases involving tying arrangements featuring a
patented item.243 In this case, the patentee conditioned sale of a patented
printhead on the sale of unpatented ink.244 Drawing on established precedent,245 the Federal Circuit maintained the distinction between patent and
antitrust approaches to patent tying regimes.246 The Federal Circuit cited
precedents such as International Salt and United States v. Loew’s, Inc. to hold
that in instances of patent tying, “the necessary market power to establish a
section 1 violation is presumed.”247 Thus, in antitrust cases involving patent
tying, there need not be an affirmative demonstration of market power.248
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit in Illinois
Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. and eliminated the differential treatment of patent tying in the patent misuse and antitrust contexts.249 Supreme
Court considered whether this presumption of market power should continue to apply in antitrust law.250 Seeking uniformity in two related areas of
law, the Court held that tying arrangements involving patented products
should be evaluated for the existence of market power (as they are in patent
misuse cases), and it eliminated the presumption of illegality in antitrust
law.251 Interestingly, although the Federal Circuit’s opinion had faithfully
followed established antitrust precedent, the Supreme Court framed its
opinion in the language of assimilation, focusing on the desire to harmonize
antitrust and patent law. The Court noted, “[G]iven the fact that the patent
misuse doctrine provided the basis for the market power presumption, it
would be anomalous to preserve the presumption in antitrust after Congress
has eliminated its foundation.”252 In so doing, Illinois Tool Works further

242. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 40–42 (2006).
243. 396 F.3d 1342, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc.,
547 U.S. 28, 40–42 (2006).
244. Id. at 1345.
245. See Taylor, supra note 12, at 459; Taylor, supra note 133, at 655.
246. Taylor, supra note 12, at 459.
247. Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1348–49 (citing Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947) and United States v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962)), vacated, Ill. Tool Works Inc. v.
Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 40–42 (2006).
248. Id.
249. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45–46 (2006).
250. Id. at 31.
251. Id. at 42; see also Holbrook, supra note 209, at 8–9 (2007).
252. Indep. Ink, 547 U.S. at 42.
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reveals a generalizing, systemizing trend at the Supreme Court, which eliminated the presumption of market power in antitrust law, thus achieving consistency between patent and antitrust doctrine.253
2. Reverse Payment Settlements
A similar drive toward legal coherence and eliminating patent exceptionalism informed the Court’s more recent opinion in FTC v. Actavis, Inc.254
This case addressed “reverse payment” settlements in which a patentee pays
an alleged infringer to not produce a patented product until the patent expires.255 Such reverse payment settlements are particularly prominent in the
pharmaceutical field due to the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984,256 commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.
The Act creates an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) that allows
generic producers to “piggyback” on the regulatory approval of branded
drugs, thus streamlining FDA approval for generics.257 In submitting an
ANDA, a generic manufacturer must assure the FDA that it will not infringe
the branded manufacturer’s patents. It can do this several ways, most relevantly by filing a “paragraph IV” certification stating that the branded company’s patent is invalid or not infringed by the generic drug.258 By law, filing
such a paragraph IV certification is considered an act of patent infringement. If the branded manufacturer brings an infringement suit within 45
days, the FDA must withhold approving the generic, usually for a 30-month
period.259 However, the Hatch-Waxman Act creates an incentive for a generic
company to be the first to file an ANDA with a paragraph IV challenge to a
branded company’s patent; the first company to do so receives 180 days of
FDA marketing exclusivity from the first commercial marketing of its
drug.260
This complicated statutory scheme encourages a patentee that manufactures branded pharmaceuticals to pay off a generic company submitting a
paragraph IV certification to prevent that generic firm from challenging the
validity of the patent. Whether such reverse payment settlements constitute
antitrust violations has become a topic of intense judicial and scholarly debate.261 In the Actavis litigation, known in lower court proceedings as FTC v.
Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit adopted a rule favorable
253. See Shubha Ghosh, Convergence?, 15 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 95, 100 (2014) (characterizing the decision as “a big move away from per se rules of illegality for tying arrangements
involving patents”).
254. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
255. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227.
256. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii) (2012).
See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 12; Hemphill, supra note 12.
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to such settlements, holding that “absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent, a reverse payment settlement is immune from antitrust
attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.”262 The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that
“antitrust laws typically prohibit agreements where one company pays a potential competitor not to enter the market,” but recognized a special rule for
reverse payment settlements for patent litigation;263 the Federal Circuit264
and the Second Circuit265 held similarly. While these courts developed rules
tending to favor such arrangements, the Third Circuit held that “a reverse
payment is prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade” and
presumptively unlawful.266
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this circuit split, and in
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., the Court eliminated any presumptions regarding reverse payment settlements involving patents.267 In so doing, the Court rejected special treatment for patent considerations in antitrust analyses,
reasoning “it would be incongruous to determine antitrust legality by measuring the settlement’s anticompetitive effects solely against patent law policy, rather than by measuring them against procompetitive antitrust policies
as well.”268 Notably, while the dissent takes an explicitly exceptionalist approach to the patent-antitrust interface,269 the majority’s approach is decidedly integrative. Reviewing prior decisions involving the antitrust
implications of reverse payment settlements involving patents,270 the Court
observed that “they seek to accommodate patent and antitrust policies, finding challenged terms and conditions unlawful unless patent policy offsets the
antitrust law policy strongly favoring competition.”271 The Court’s opinion
is directionally neutral; the Court rejects the Eleventh Circuit’s presumption
of legality as well as the FTC’s proffered presumption of illegality.272 Rather,
262. 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2223 (2013).
263. Watson Pharm., 677 F.3d at 1307 (“[R]everse payment settlements of patent litigation
present[ ] atypical cases because ‘one of the parties own[s] a patent.’ ” (second alteration in
original) (quoting Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th Cir. 2003))).
264. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 544 F.3d 1323, 1332–37
(Fed. Cir. 2008), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
265. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212–13 (2d Cir. 2006),
rev’d sub nom., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
266. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom., FTC v.
Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
267. 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013).
268. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231.
269. See id. at 2238 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“A patent carves out an exception to the
applicability of antitrust laws.”).
270. See id. at 2232–33.
271. Id. at 2233.
272. Id. at 2237.
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the Court maintains the flexibility and case-by-case determination of traditional rule of reason inquiries in antitrust cases.273 As Robin Feldman observes, Actavis represents a move away from patent exceptionalism in the
context of pharmaceutical regulation and antitrust.274 Shubha Ghosh goes
further, noting that the majority “rejected a sharp separation between patent
and antitrust” and “may even signal a convergence of these two battling
areas of law.”275
***
In sum, the Supreme Court has consistently assimilated patent law to its
conception of broader legal doctrines and concepts, thus stamping out patent exceptionalism. This project has taken several forms. First, the Court has
policed structural concerns, rigorously applying crosscutting, trans-substantive regulatory schemes like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the APA,
and jurisdictional statutes. Second, the Court has invoked equitable principles to reconfigure the law of patent infringement remedies. Third, the
Court has borrowed concepts from unrelated areas of law to shape patent
doctrine. Fourth, the Court has rejected specialized patent rules in favor of
general precedent and ordinary connotations of legal terms. Fifth, the Court
has harmonized patent and antitrust doctrine, eliminating per se rules that
treat antitrust cases involving patents differently than other antitrust disputes. Reminiscent of nineteenth century formalists who saw law as a coherent, unified whole,276 the Supreme Court has sought to assimilate patent law
to broader legal principles. The remainder of this Article explains the scope
and motivations of the Court’s universalizing project and establishes principles for guiding doctrinal assimilation in patent law and other legal domains
going forward.
IV. Understanding the Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law
The Supreme Court’s assimilation of patent law is descriptively striking
and raises important questions regarding the scope and motivations of the
Court’s behavior. Accordingly, this Part first analyzes the contours of this
assimilationist project before offering various theories exploring its causes
and implications.
A. The Scope and Contours of the Assimilationist Project
1. Transcendent Issues Versus the Heartland of Patent Law
In understanding the Supreme Court’s assimilation of patent law, it is
helpful to recognize its circumscribed nature, for this project does not apply
273. Id. at 2238.
274. See Feldman, supra note 12, at 67.
275. Ghosh, supra note 253, at 95. Contra id. at 112 (cautioning that convergence is still
“far away”).
276. See supra Part I.
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to all of the Court’s recent patent cases. In general, this assimilationist project does not extend to “heartland” issues of substantive patent doctrine,
such as patentable subject matter doctrine,277 nonobviousness,278 prosecution history estoppel,279 the on-sale bar,280 and the doctrine of equivalents.281
After all, these doctrines have little to no analog in other areas of law.282
Unlike the decisions reviewed above, Supreme Court opinions in these
heartland areas notably lack citations to cases, concepts, and principles beyond patent law.
Rather, the Court’s assimilationist project tends to focus on transcendent areas of law that touch upon patent doctrine as well as other doctrinal
areas, such as appellate review of district courts and agencies, jurisdiction,
and remedies. Much patent assimilation deals with procedural rules, and a
consistent theme from the Supreme Court is that “[t]he same rules apply to
litigation involving patents as in ordinary, non-patent litigation.”283 Interestingly, even prior to the formation of the Federal Circuit in 1982, the Supreme Court’s patent jurisprudence focused not on substantive patent law
but on crosscutting issues, such as venue and procedure, preemption, the
common law of patent licensing, and the relationship between patent law
and antitrust.284 Furthermore, in the early years following the Federal Circuit’s establishment, on the rare occasion that the Supreme Court reviewed a
patent case, it tended to focus on similarly crosscutting issues of procedure
and jurisdiction.285 In significant part, the Supreme Court, a generalist institution, has been most confident intervening in patent affairs to enforce transcendent legal principles rather than delving into the technical details of
substantive patent law.286
277. See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs. Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
278. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
279. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
280. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998).
281. See Warner-Jenkinson, Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
282. There is some conceptual similarity between subject matter doctrine in patent and
copyright, though this has not manifested prominently in the doctrine. See Peter Lee, The
Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 Wash. L. Rev. 39, 52–54 (2008).
283. Castanias et al., supra note 101, at 815.
284. John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of
Patents, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 273, 294.
285. See Dreyfuss, supra note 77, at 792 (“In the first twenty or so years, its review of the
Federal Circuit was largely intermittent and confined to procedural issues . . . .” (emphasis in
original)); Golden, supra note 184, at 668 (noting that Supreme Court opinions from 1983 to
1995 primarily addressed “procedure, jurisdiction, or the interaction between patent law and
another legal regime”); Holbrook, supra note 11, at 63 (“Even in the cases the [Supreme]
Court did take, the issue was often tangential to substantive patent law, involving instead
constitutional or procedural issues.”); Holbrook, supra note 209, at 1 n.2.
286. Cf. Golden, supra note 184, at 700 (“When the Court addresses a question of substantive patent law, it tends to move outside a comfort zone where it can pick between alternative doctrinal formulations that lower courts have already adopted.”).
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2. Federal Circuit Exceptionalism and Beyond
As discussed further below, a significant proportion of the Supreme
Court’s assimilation of patent law involves conforming exceptional Federal
Circuit doctrine to preexisting legal standards.287 Even before delving into
the Court’s motivations, however, it is important to note that the Court’s
assimilationist project is not confined to this pattern. First, under the rubric
of assimilation, the Court has created new doctrine and labeled it as mainstream, as seen in its creative invocation of equitable principles in eBay Inc.
v. MercExchange, L.L.C.288 Second, the Court has reversed the Federal Circuit
even when that appellate court has not “gone off the rails” to create an
exceptional rule, but merely decided an open question of law. This is the
case, for instance, with Gunn v. Minton, where the Federal Circuit adopted
an expansive conception of federal jurisdiction over patent affairs, which the
Supreme Court subsequently reversed.289 Third, the Court has invoked principles of assimilation in reversing the Federal Circuit even when that appellate court had ruled consistently with binding precedent, as in Illinois Tool
Works Inc. Furthermore, the Court’s assimilationist project extends to courts
other than the Federal Circuit. For example, the Court’s reconciliation of
patent and antitrust principles in FTC v. Actavis resolved a circuit split involving the Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuits (as well as the Federal Circuit).290 More broadly, the Court’s assimilationist drive in the patentantitrust nexus has less to do with Federal Circuit exceptionalism and more
to do with a general trend of eliminating per se rules in antitrust. Although
Federal Circuit exceptionalism accounts for much of the Supreme Court’s
assimilationist project, it does not explain all of it.
3. Intersections with Narrowing Patent Rights and
Favoring Holistic Standards
Understanding the scope and contours of the Supreme Court’s assimilation of patent law also gives rise to the question of how this phenomenon
relates to the two other, more established, theories of Supreme Court patent
jurisprudence: narrowing patent rights and favoring holistic standards over
bright-line rules. These three trends are not mutually exclusive, and in fact
they frequently reinforce each other. For example, the Court’s decision in
eBay reflects all three phenomena: the decision weakened patent rights, replaced a bright-line rule with a holistic standard, and sought to conform
patent law to broader equitable principles.291 In several ways, the Court’s
assimilationist project corroborates a trend of narrowing patent rights. To
the extent that exceptional patent doctrine from the Federal Circuit has
287. See infra Section IV.B.1.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 182–184.
289. See supra text accompany notes 163–175.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 261–275.
291. See supra notes 176–184 and accompanying text.
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tended to expand patent rights, Supreme Court assimilation will constrain
those rights. Furthermore, to the extent that exceptional patent doctrine has
tended to expand the Federal Circuit’s own power, for example, by allowing
less deferential review of district courts and the PTO, the Supreme Court’s
assimilationist project will constrain the authority of a pro-patent institution, thus indirectly narrowing patent rights as well.
The Court’s assimilation of patent law also reinforces its preference for
holistic standards over formalistic rules. As David Taylor observes, the Federal Circuit’s rule-oriented jurisprudence stems in part from an exceptional
need for certainty and predictability in patent law.292 But the Supreme Court
does not appear to value certainty as much as the Federal Circuit, thus contributing to its embrace of more holistic standards. As Taylor observes, “It is
the role of a generalist court of last resort to view rule-based adjudication by
a more specialized court with suspicion and, in the absence of well-reasoned
justification for rule-based adjudication, to overturn the rule-based test created by the more specialized court.”293 Even Judge Linn of the Federal Circuit has recognized the Supreme Court’s “condemnation of patent-specific,
bright-line rules in favor of flexible mainstream dogma.”294 The Supreme
Court’s assimilation of patent law to general legal principles is thus not independent of its tendency to weaken patent rights and favor holistic standards. Rather, these trends reinforce each other.
B. Motivations Driving Assimilation
Several motivations drive the Supreme Court’s assimilation of patent
doctrine. Among them, this Section argues that the Court’s project reins in
patent exceptionalism by the Federal Circuit, reins in the Federal Circuit’s
own self-aggrandizing doctrinal maneuvers, reflects policy interests that
range beyond patent law, lowers cognitive burdens when engaging unfamiliar patent issues, and provides rhetorical legitimacy for new doctrine.
1. Reining in the Federal Circuit’s Doctrinal Exceptionalism
To understand the Supreme Court’s assimilation of patent law, one
must first consider the Federal Circuit—for in many ways (but not all), the
Court’s behavior is a response to the exceptional doctrine of that quasispecialized court.295 When Congress established the Federal Circuit in 1982,
it created a “court with a mission.”296 According to the legislative history of
the Federal Courts Improvement Act, Congress had determined that there

292. Taylor, supra note 12, at 467; see infra note 317 and accompanying text.
293. Taylor, supra note 12, at 490.
294. Linn, supra note 66, at 6.
295. Golden, supra note 151, at 572 (“[R]ecent Supreme Court scrutiny might be understood as a response to semi-specialization’s ills.”).
296. Control Res., Inc. v. Delta Elecs., Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 121, 123 (D. Mass. 2001).
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was “a special need for nationwide uniformity”297 in patent law, and establishing the Federal Circuit aimed to “increase doctrinal stability” in the
field.298 In its conception, the Federal Circuit seemed attuned to a particular
constituency—business people—and their unique need for certainty in patent law.299 Indeed, the court’s first chief judge emphasized the unique role
and responsibility of the Federal Circuit in rendering patent law more
certain.300
Although some early observers suggested that the Federal Circuit
avoided “the entanglements and strictures of a specialized court,”301 its subsequent history indicates otherwise. As demonstrated, the Federal Circuit
has consistently produced exceptional doctrine in a wide variety of areas.
Due to its limited subject matter jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit has developed a deep appreciation for the uniqueness of patents and sought to tailor
(or ignore) general doctrines based on the particularities of patent litigation;
in so doing, the court may give less deference to the subtle policy balances
already reflected in those general doctrines.302 As further evidence of its narrow focus, the Federal Circuit rarely looks beyond statute and doctrine to
consider myriad issues in innovation policy,303 let alone academic and social
science evidence,304 in an explicit fashion. This seems particularly peculiar

297. S. Rep. No. 97-275, at 2 (1981); H.R. Rep. No. 97-312, at 20 (1981); see Gugliuzza,
supra note 12, at 1798; Kumar, supra note 33, at 243–44; Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy,
Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1619, 1620 (2007).
298. S. Rep. No. 97-275, at 5.
299. Id. at 6.
300. Howard T. Markey, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Challenge and Opportunity, 34 Am. U. L. Rev. 595, 595 (1985) (“The challenge to the court and its bar is to create
and maintain a uniform, reliable, predictable, nationally-applicable body of law in each of the
many and varied fields of substantive law assigned exclusively to the court.”).
301. Randall R. Rader, Specialized Courts: The Legislative Response, 40 Am. U. L. Rev.
1003, 1014 (1991).
302. Cf. F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the Periphery of Intellectual
Property, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 174, 182 (2004) (“Courts that adopt special approaches to
address matters at the periphery of IP law run the risk of crafting judicial doctrines that
inappropriately override well-established bodies of law that are informed by longstanding judicial and scholarly thought and consideration of each area.”).
303. See Dreyfuss, supra note 108, at 782.
304. See Dreyfuss, supra note 101, at 821; Dreyfuss, supra note 108, at 780; Paul R. Michel,
The Challenge Ahead: Increasing Predictability in Federal Circuit Jurisprudence for the New Century, 43 Am. U. L. Rev. 1231, 1245 (1994); Craig Allen Nard, Toward a Cautious Approach to
Obeisance: The Role of Scholarship in Federal Circuit Patent Law Jurisprudence, 39 Hous. L.
Rev. 667, 678–83 (2002). But see S. Jay Plager & Lynne E. Pettigrew, Rethinking Patent Law’s
Uniformity Principle: A Response to Nard and Duffy, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1735, 1751 (2007)
(indicating that more academic commentary “finds its way into judicial thought than the
absence of specific citation suggests”).
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given the policy-oriented, utilitarian nature of the patent system.305 Although the Federal Circuit has created more internal doctrinal consistency,306 it has also tended to “take patents out of the mainstream of legal
thought.”307
The Supreme Court is situated very differently. As a generalist court
atop the judicial hierarchy, it has a wider purview than the quasi-specialized
Federal Circuit. Justice Breyer explicitly acknowledged the value of the Supreme Court as a generalist check on the Federal Circuit, observing that “a
decision from this generalist Court could contribute to the important ongoing debate, among both specialists and generalists, as to whether the patent
system, as currently administered and enforced, adequately reflects the ‘careful balance’ that ‘the federal patent laws . . . embod[y].’ ”308 Perhaps unaware
or unimpressed by the unique demands of patent law, the Supreme Court
has instead integrated patents within the general legal frameworks with
which it is familiar.
2. Reining in the Federal Circuit
In considering the Supreme Court’s assimilationist agenda, it is important to note not only the existence of Federal Circuit exceptionalism but also
its implications for the balance of institutional influence within the patent
system. The Federal Circuit produces doctrine that not only deviates from
legal norms but also tends to enhance its own power, such as when it
adopted less deferential standards of review of district court and PTO factual
findings.309 These doctrines reveal that the Federal Circuit may not only have
an institutional bias in favor of patents,310 but in favor of itself as well. This is
particularly the case for the Federal Circuit’s former practice of reviewing
district court claim construction de novo.311 Similarly, the Federal Circuit’s
expansive conception of jurisdiction over patent cases had the effect of increasing its own influence in patent affairs.312
305. Rai, supra note 49, at 1037–38, 1040.
306. Dreyfuss, supra note 49, at 24 (“[T]he court has begun to make patent law more
accurate, precise, and coherent.”).
307. See id. at 25; cf. Balkin, supra note 40, at 138 (“If we are not aware of the content of
legal norms in many different parts of the law, they cannot figure into our awareness of possible sources of moral conflict and normative incoherence.”). But see Michel, supra note 304, at
1232 (“The court had also done much to bring litigation of private patent cases . . . more into
the mainstream of American civil litigation.”).
308. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 138 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari) (alteration in original) (quoting Bonito
Boats, Inc., v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989)).
309. Rai, supra note 49, at 1065.
310. Id. at 1114.
311. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Mayer, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]his court treats the district court as an intake clerk, whose only role is to
collect, shuffle and collate evidence . . . .”); Rai, supra note 49, at 1059.
312. See supra text accompanying notes 152–170.

1456

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 114:1413

Thus, in parallel to eliminating patent exceptionalism for its own sake,
the Supreme Court has reined in an ambitious appellate court that has created self-serving doctrine.313 Indeed, by asserting appellate jurisdiction over
the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court is helping to shift the balance of
power between itself and that quasi-specialized court.314 And in the particular structural doctrines enunciated, the Court is also elevating district courts
and the PTO315 in influence relative to the Federal Circuit. Thus, at an institutional level, just as the Supreme Court has sought to bring patent doctrine
in line with general legal standards, it has also sought to bring the Federal
Circuit in line with what the Court perceives as its proper role in the federal
judiciary. In tamping down exceptionalist patent doctrine from the Federal
Circuit, the Supreme Court’s assimilationist project tamps down the Federal
Circuit itself.
3. Canvassing a Wider Array of Policy Interests
On related lines, the Supreme Court considers and responds to a wider
set of policy interests than the Federal Circuit. Although the Federal Circuit
has a reputation for not considering policy interests in its decisions,316 that is
not really the case. The writings and opinions of its judges consistently emphasize the policy interests of certainty, predictability, and clear notice in
patent law,317 which contribute to the Federal Circuit’s embrace of brightline rules. At least ostensibly, the Federal Circuit is also attuned to the patent
system’s overall policy objective “to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.”318 Indeed, the implicit assumption of much Federal Circuit
doctrine is that strong patent rights, bright-line rules, and occasional exceptions from general legal norms will best promote technological progress.
The Supreme Court, however, is attuned to a broader set of policy interests. To be sure, the Court frequently pledges fealty to the constitutional
313. See Gugliuzza, supra note 12, at 1795 (“[T]he Federal Circuit has supplemented this
already significant authority by impeding other government institutions from shaping patent
law.”).
314. Cf. Lee, supra note 12, at 43 (“The Supreme Court’s deference to Federal Circuit
jurisprudence, as well as its general indifference to patent matters, appears to have ended.”).
315. See Long, supra note 142, at 1973 (characterizing Zurko as one of several attempts by
which the PTO has sought to expand its influence).
316. Rai, supra note 49, at 1101.
317. Taylor, supra note 133, at 641–44, 680; see Gugliuzza, supra note 12, at 1819; Michel,
supra note 304, at 1241 (cautioning against the dangers of uncertainty in patent law); Lucas S.
Osborn, Instrumentalism at the Federal Circuit, 56 St. Louis U. L.J. 419, 437 (2012) (arguing
that, contrary to perceptions that the Federal Circuit eschews policy considerations, a policy
objective of promoting certainty informs much of its doctrine).
318. U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538,
1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (invoking the constitutional objective of promoting technological progress to support the court’s approach to damages). But see Thomas, supra note 65, at
796 (“Innovation policy incorporates other values that present an uneasy fit with the Federal
Circuit’s chosen rules.”).
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objective of promoting technological progress,319 though interestingly, it
often deploys weakened patent rights and holistic standards to achieve that
aim.320 The Court is less explicit in valuing certainty as an overriding policy
objective. In a broader sense, as Judge Linn of the Federal Circuit acknowledges, while the Federal Circuit tends to focus on providing bright-line rules
for business people navigating patent law, the Supreme Court “deals with
legal principles and the policy implications they engender.”321 As manifested
in its assimilationist agenda, the Court cares not only about certainty and
promoting technological progress but also about the macroscopic aim of
ensuring coherence and consistency across diverse areas of federal law.
Implicitly, the Supreme Court also prioritizes the policy aims inhering
in various trans-substantive statutory and doctrinal regimes. Thus, the
Court appears to countenance the policy determination embodied in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that appellate courts should review factual
findings for clear error.322 The Court has given significant weight to the policy rationale of the APA, which seeks “greater uniformity of procedure and
standardization of administrative practice.”323 And the Court has signed on
to a modest conception of “arising under” jurisdiction that, among other
effects, serves interests of vertical federalism by ensuring a greater role for
state courts to adjudicate legal disputes involving patents.324 Due to its superior position and holistic perspective, the Supreme Court is better situated
to weigh and address these various policy interests than the Federal Circuit.
As Jack Balkin observes, “Few people have considered all the possible conflicts among rules across different areas of law. Compartmentalization of law
into different subject areas probably exacerbates this phenomenon . . . .”325
As a generalist court at the top of the judicial hierarchy, the Supreme Court

319. See, e.g., Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126
(2006) (“[S]ometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’. . . . “) (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari)
(emphasis in original).
320. See supra Part II.
321. Linn, supra note 66, at 7; see also Mullally, supra note 75, at 1126–28 (describing the
value of bright-line rules to the PTO).
322. See generally Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (“The trial
judge’s major role is the determination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling that role
comes expertise.”); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977) (noting that the trial on the
merits should be the “ ‘main event,’ so to speak, rather than a ‘tryout on the road’ ”).
323. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950); see Dir., Office of Workers’
Comp. Programs, Dep’t of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 271 (1994) (“We do
not lightly presume exemptions to the APA . . . .”); Scalia, supra note 151, at 363.
324. Cf. Grossi, supra note 35, at 973 (noting the importance of “structural interpretation” and federalism in legal process approaches to adjudication).
325. Balkin, supra note 40, at 139.
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is more likely to value synthesis326 and to identify, assess, and resolve divergences between various areas of law.327
There is an interesting institutional irony in these dynamics. The Federal
Circuit has largely succeeded in unifying patent law due to its near-exclusive
jurisdiction over patent appeals.328 However, in unifying patent law and rendering it more determinate, it has created an “exceptional” body of doctrine
that deviates from general legal norms. The Supreme Court, animated by its
generalist orientation and a wider array of policy interests, has sought to
unify patent doctrine with general legal principles. In so doing, however, it
has shorn the “unified” patent law arising from the Federal Circuit of much
of its doctrinal exceptionalism and uniqueness. In championing assimilation, the Supreme Court may be undermining one of the potential benefits
of having a quasi-specialized appellate court for patent cases.
4. Relying on General Legal Principles to Navigate
Technical Patent Issues
There are also less charitable reasons to explain the Supreme Court’s
assimilation of patent law. Somewhat pessimistically, the Court may resort
to general principles of law to compensate for its inexperience with technical
elements of the patent system. This can occur in several ways. First, analogical reasoning allows the Supreme Court to rely on familiar legal principles
when navigating unfamiliar questions of patent doctrine. This is perhaps
best illustrated by Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., where the court
drew on a completely unrelated field, criminal law, to elucidate the willful
blindness standard for induced infringement.329 Though this may appear incongruous, criminal law is probably more familiar than doctrines of indirect
infringement to the justices of the Supreme Court, including Justice Alito, a
former United States Attorney who wrote the majority opinion.
Such invocation of the familiar is also evident in Teva Pharmaceuticals
USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., which held that appellate courts should review
district court factual findings informing claim construction for clear error.330
The Court used an analogy to illustrate a framework in which claim construction remains an ultimate question of law while its subsidiary factual
inquiries are reviewed for clear error. Drawing again on criminal law, it
326. Cf. Gerald Holton, “Lumpers,” “Splitters,” and Scientific Progress, Acad. Questions,
Spring 1995, at 14, 15 (describing great synthetic scientists like Darwin, Maxwell, and Einstein
who “like to stand, as it were, on a high mountain from which they have, at a glance, the whole
varied landscape below”).
327. This project may be aided by a patent bar increasingly comprised of general practice
litigators who “have less tolerance for treating patent cases differently from other cases . . . and
are more comfortable challenging the Federal Circuit in the Supreme Court when it adopts
special rules in patent cases.” O’Malley, National Interest, supra note 84, at 6.
328. Dreyfuss, supra note 101, at 789.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 195–198.
330. 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015).
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noted that appellate courts review district courts’ determinations of the voluntariness of a confession de novo, while reviewing subsidiary factual questions, such as whether the police intimidated the defendant, for clear
error.331 Here again, recourse to an unrelated (but more familiar) area of law
helped guide the Court. Reasoning by analogy is a hallmark of generalist
common law courts, and it eases cognitive burdens by providing a familiar
intellectual foundation for engaging unfamiliar patent doctrine.
Second, beyond simplifying engagement with technical elements of the
patent system, invoking broad legal principles—or even the rhetorical trope
of legal consistency itself—can allow Supreme Court justices to sidestep such
technical elements altogether. Patent adjudication generates significant cognitive burdens, particularly for generalist courts, due in large part to the
complex technologies often at stake.332 Furthermore, patent law itself, which
is rather arcane, can also be quite technically complex.333 As Justice Scalia
once observed in a patent case, “That point [of patent doctrine] is much less
tied to general principles of law with which I am familiar, and much more
related to the peculiarities of patent litigation, with which I deal only sporadically.”334 And more recently in oral argument in Gunn v. Minton, Justice
Scalia further observed, “Federal judges . . . are not interested in . . . getting
into the weeds of patent law.”335 And even if a particular patent doctrine is
not especially complicated, such as the Federal Circuit’s rule of de novo review of claim construction, understanding the importance and implications
of such seemingly simple rules requires an intimate knowledge of the patent
system and innovation dynamics. Faced with patent doctrine that raises
technical challenges, it is not surprising that Supreme Court justices would
grasp for more familiar legal concepts for guidance.
Along these lines, invoking trans-substantive legal principles allows Supreme Court justices to short circuit detailed doctrinal and contextual analyses of patent law, thus reducing cognitive demands. As I have explored in
other work, the manner in which doctrine is structured, as well as particular
modes of legal reasoning, can vastly impact the complexity of patent adjudication.336 For instance, the Supreme Court’s preference for holistic standards
has, perhaps ironically, made cases more difficult for generalist judges, for
such standards often require detailed factual examinations of technologies
and their context. The Supreme Court’s assimilation of patent law represents
an opposite phenomenon. By invoking general legal principles to resolve
questions of patent law, the Supreme Court decreases its engagement with
331. Teva Pharm., 135 S. Ct. at 842.
332. Lee, supra note 12, at 9–12.
333. Id. at 12–13. The complexity of patent law, of course, depends on the particular
doctrine at issue. See Duffy, supra note 284, at 331.
334. Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 103 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
335. Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013) (No.
11–1118).
336. See Lee, supra note 12.

1460

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 114:1413

the particularities of the patent system and thus decreases its own cognitive
burdens. The Supreme Court need not wrestle with the intricacies of patent
law if a general rule is available to resolve the legal question at hand.
This dynamic is evident, for example, when comparing the differing approaches of the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court to claim construction. The Federal Circuit had fashioned a specialized rule whereby claim
construction, which encompasses factual determinations, was reviewed de
novo on appeal.337 This decision was the controversial outcome of years of
debate among Federal Circuit judges, who were acutely aware of the unique
role of claim construction in patent litigation and the ways that de novo
versus more deferential review might impact the patent system. This decision also considered extensive input from the technology community. The
Supreme Court’s analysis in Teva,338 however, largely sidesteps these complex and nuanced debates.339 In its brief opinion, the Court did not extensively examine the rather unique role of claim construction in patent
litigation, relying instead on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6) that
appellate courts should review district court factual findings for clear error.
Invoking the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the APA, or any other transcendent principle allows the Court to avoid more nuanced analysis, obviating deep engagement with the particularities of patent doctrine and
practice.340
5. Legitimizing New Doctrine through the Rhetoric of Assimilation
One of the most striking aspects of the Supreme Court’s “assimilation”
of patent law is that in some cases, it doesn’t involve assimilation at all—at
least in the traditional sense of conforming exceptional doctrine to some
preexisting norm. As noted above, the Court’s assimilationist project has
involved creating new doctrine and labeling it as mainstream as well as reversing the Federal Circuit on open questions of law341 or even when it had
faithfully applied precedent.342 The Court couched these rulings in the language of assimilation and consistency with existing principles, thus revealing
a deeply rhetorical form of assimilation that is independent from (and can
even undermine) the objective of substantively reconciling patent law with
established norms. Indeed, the appearance of conforming patent doctrine to
some preexisting standard can enhance the perceived legitimacy of new doctrine and obscure its exceptional nature. Ironically, the rhetoric of assimilation provides effective cover for introducing legal innovation.
337. See Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1281
(Fed. Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015). But see Anderson & Menell, supra note 106,
at 61 (finding a trend of informal deference in more recent opinions).
338. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324 (2005).
339. See supra text accompanying notes 120–125.
340. Cf. Grossi, supra note 35, at 1010 (“[T]he application of mechanical tests is easier
than going beneath the form to [the] substance of the matter.”).
341. See supra text accompanying notes 164–175.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 245–253.
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This rhetorical invocation of assimilation is evident, for instance, in the
Court’s eBay decision,343 which framed a novel equitable test (which is well
tailored to the patent context) as a historical, general standard to govern all
injunctions.344 Framing this test in the language of assimilation and universality enhanced its legitimacy and may promote its faithful adoption by
lower courts. Similarly, in Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.,
although the Federal Circuit faithfully applied existing antitrust precedent in
holding that the presence of a patent in a tying arrangement gave rise to a
presumption of market power,345 the Supreme Court utilized the language of
assimilation to shift the doctrine in a new direction. Citing the desire to
conform patent and antitrust doctrine, the Court altered antitrust doctrine
to eliminate the presumption of market power in tying arrangements involving patents. The Court thus invoked the legitimizing rhetoric of assimilation
to help justify a new doctrinal innovation.
V. Toward a Refined Exceptionalism for Patent Law
Although the Supreme Court has rather broadly assimilated patent law
across several doctrinal areas, the appropriateness of such assimilation depends on context. This Part questions the categorical value of universality
and provides recommendations for a refined exceptionalism for patent law.
In particular, while the Supreme Court should value broad legal consistency
and coherence, the Federal Circuit’s unique institutional expertise warrants
bending traditional rules of deference in some areas. But the Supreme Court
should vigilantly police self-aggrandizing jurisdictional moves by the Federal
Circuit. In general, the Court should use open-ended, holistic standards
(with appropriate guidance) that allow for broad applicability while maintaining flexible elaboration for particular situations. Furthermore, while this
Article has focused primarily on courts as articulators of law, this Part identifies specific roles for Congress to define patent-related exceptions from
general principles when warranted.
There are, of course, strong arguments for conforming patent law to
general legal norms. As described above, there is a long tradition of valuing
broad consistency in the law.346 Furthermore, principles of justice and horizontal equity demand that “equals be treated equally.”347 Thus, for instance,
it seems intuitive that a plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment in a patent
case should face the same “actual controversy” standard as a plaintiff seeking
such a judgment in an environmental case. Additionally, several trans-substantive legal regimes discussed in this Article, such as the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the APA, have broad consistency and elimination of
343. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
344. See supra notes 176–187 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 243–253 and accompanying text.
346. See supra Part I.
347. Cf. Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 Nat’l Tax
J. 139, 139 (1989) (exploring horizontal equity in tax law and policy).
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exceptionalism as their animating purpose.348 Universality advances judicial
and legal economy by allowing judges and lawyers to master a limited set of
central principles that they can apply in myriad settings. Finally, having the
same rules apply to all substantive fields of law decreases opportunities for
rent-seeking and interest group politics inherent in exceptionalism.349 After
all, “sui generis approaches are notorious for opening the door to undue
influence by groups whose interests focus on that area of law.”350
These values, however, must be weighed against other policy interests.
For better or for worse, patent law is different, and there are compelling
reasons for selective doctrinal exceptionalism in particular areas. Before providing context-specific principles to guide patent exceptionalism, three caveats are in order. First, these prescriptions largely do not apply to the
Supreme Court’s engagement with “heartland” patent doctrine. As described above, the Court’s assimilationist project is less apposite to technical
doctrines such as patentable subject matter, nonobviousness, and the requirement of claim definiteness, which have little analog outside of patent
law.351 Second, any prescriptions must consider the Supreme Court’s institutional limitations in engaging patent law. Commentators have long criticized
the Court’s ability to understand patent law and craft effective doctrine.352
The Supreme Court is also acutely aware of its limitations and is generally
reluctant to “micromanag[e]” the Federal Circuit.353 Accordingly, the following prescriptions advocate a rather modest role for the Supreme Court in
shaping patent doctrine. Third and relatedly, however, it bears emphasizing
that the procedural and peripheral areas of patent law subject to assimilation
are those where the Supreme Court enjoys special institutional advantages.
While the Court may struggle with the technical details of substantive patent
law, its holistic, generalist nature renders it uniquely suited to fitting patent
law (or any other specialized field of doctrine) into a broader legal fabric.

348. See, e.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950); Marcus, supra note 13,
at 1194 (“Trans-substantivity is one of the most fundamental principles of doctrinal design for
modern civil procedure . . . .” (citation omitted)).
349. See Dreyfuss, supra note 77, at 789–90.
350. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 126, at 274.
351. See supra Section IV.A.1.
352. See, e.g., Donald S. Chisum, The Supreme Court and Patent Law: Does Shallow Reasoning Lead to Thin Law?, 3 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1999); Duffy, supra note 284, at
329–32; Golden, supra note 184, at 672–700; Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the
Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 387, 408 (2001).
353. See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2130 (2014) (alteration
in original) (quoting Warner-Jenkinson, Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40
(1997)). But see Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 138 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari) (noting the importance of generalists as
well as specialists in debates over the design of the patent system); Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 839 (2002) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(“[O]ccasional decisions by courts with broader jurisdiction will provide an antidote to the
risk that the specialized court may develop an institutional bias.”).
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Assimilating patent doctrine to an existing legal framework is often appropriate where a well-established standard exists for a discrete issue in general litigation. In that context, deviating from an established norm is usually
unwarranted. Thus, for instance, the Supreme Court correctly rejected the
Federal Circuit’s exceptional definition of “exceptional” cases for purposes
of awarding attorney’s fees as well as the Federal Circuit’s unusual practice
of reviewing such determinations de novo.354 Instead, the Supreme Court
adopted a much more commonplace definition of an “exceptional” case as
“simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive
strength of a party’s litigating position . . . or the unreasonable manner in
which the case was litigated.”355 Illustrating a theme to which this Article will
return, the Supreme Court’s formulation is particularly helpful because of
its open-ended, tailorable nature. The Court’s flexible standard for attorney’s fees allows district courts to address particular challenges in patent
litigation (such as patent trolls) while not hamstringing courts in other types
of litigation with a rigid rule.
Furthermore, subject to qualification, analogizing from unrelated areas
of law to illuminate novel questions of patent doctrine may be a helpful
form of patent assimilation. This is the case, for example, when the Court
borrows from criminal law to inform the mental state for induced infringement.356 While such borrowing may seem incongruous at first glance, it also
enhances understanding of a new standard. Rather than construct a sui
generis rule, the Court can invoke a familiar concept for which reams of
precedent exist.357 Of course, analogies can obscure as much as they illuminate.358 In drawing analogies, the Supreme Court (as well as all courts) must
be aware of the differences between the bridged concepts and the limitations
of comparisons.
Assimilation is also appropriate when used to cabin the Federal Circuit’s
jurisdictional ambitions. Although the Federal Circuit’s expertise in patent
affairs is an asset to be exploited, the Supreme Court has been rightly vigilant to reject the Federal Circuit’s attempts to expand its own jurisdiction,
and federal jurisdiction more generally, over legal disputes involving patents.359 For instance, while the Federal Circuit has expressed fealty to traditional principles of jurisdiction and federalism, it is not surprising that it has
embraced a broad conception of federal jurisdiction over patent disputes,
354. See supra Section III.D.2.
355. Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014).
356. See supra Section III.C.
357. See, e.g., Commil USA, LLC. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1930 (2015).
358. See Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent Infringement as Criminal Conduct, 19 Mich. Telecomm.
& Tech. L. Rev. 1, 31–39 (2012) (criticizing Global-Tech’s importation of a criminal law concept into patent law).
359. See supra Section III.A.3. Cf. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S.
800, 812 (1988) (agreeing with the Federal Circuit that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a case
where the well-pleaded complaint did not contain a patent issue and there was an alternative,
nonpatent theory available for the claims); Grossi, supra note 35, at 995–97.
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based partly on rationales of expertise and uniformity.360 In this regard, the
principles of trans-substantivity and the general applicability of law are useful mechanisms to police potentially self-aggrandizing doctrine.361 While the
Supreme Court may not enjoy any comparative advantage in the technical
details of patent doctrine, it enjoys a particular advantage in balancing various institutional actors given its position at the top of the judicial hierarchy.362 A more parsimonious conception of “arising under” jurisdiction, for
example, serves interests of vertical federalism that the Federal Circuit may
not consider sufficiently.363
In some contexts, however, the unique role of the Federal Circuit justifies some deviation from general legal norms. In particular, the exceptional
nature of the Federal Circuit pushes against the general scheme of appellate
review embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Commentators
have argued that because the Federal Circuit is a quasi-specialized court, it
should not be subject to general principles of deferential review of district
court factual findings.364 As Rochelle Dreyfuss observes, “it seems somewhat
peculiar to allow a layman’s decision to stand on a technical issue such as the
content of prior art, when the experienced judges of the [Federal Circuit],
and the experts they employ, think that the finding is wrong, but not ‘clearly
erroneous.’ ”365 The logic of Rule 52(a), in which an appellate court defers to
a trial court because of the latter’s proximity to facts, seems mitigated when
the appellate court possesses technical expertise in the relevant subject matter.366 Responding to the Supreme Court’s holding in Dennison, Dreyfuss
argues in favor of the Federal Circuit enjoying a broader role in fact-finding
“or at least, an ability to require both juries and trial judges to find facts
with greater particularity.”367
The expertise of the Federal Circuit also pushes against traditional canons of deference to agencies in the APA. As explored above, Attorney General Clark’s 1947 Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act explicitly
stated that the operative provision of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 704, did not apply
360. See, e.g., Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P.,
504 F.3d 1262, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
361. Cf. Marcus, supra note 13, at 1195 (“Trans-substantivity . . . responds to a set of
institutional deficits that can degrade the quality of procedural, interpretive, and administrative doctrine that judges fashion.” (emphasis in original)).
362. Janis, supra note 352, at 408; see also Marcus, supra note 13, at 1218 (“[T]ranssubstantivity has to do with the proper allocation of decision-making power among government institutions based on their respective competencies.”).
363. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014 Wisc. L. Rev. 11, 69–70 (describing certain benefits to state court involvement in patent affairs). But see Grossi, supra note 35,
at 1017 (criticizing the Court’s decision in Gunn v. Minton because it renders it too easy to
deny federal jurisdiction).
364. Dreyfuss, supra note 49, at 47–53; Rai, supra note 49, at 1088.
365. Dreyfuss, supra note 49, at 48.
366. Dreyfuss, supra note 77, at 797.
367. Dreyfuss, supra note 49, at 61–62.

June 2016]

The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law

1465

to appellate review of Patent Office factual findings by the CCPA.368 More
broadly, traditional principles of deference to specialized agencies are less
relevant when applied to a quasi-specialized appellate court, for that court
also possesses subject-matter expertise.369 Notably, while the Supreme Court
applied the APA to Federal Circuit review of PTO factual findings in Dickinson v. Zurko, it conceded that the Federal Circuit, due to its expertise in
patent law, could review PTO fact-finding “through the lens of patent related experience.”370
Even if the Court is not willing to recognize exceptions to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the APA, Congress could step in to legislate a
more expansive role for the Federal Circuit. Although this Article has focused on court-made doctrine, Congress has an important role to play in
considering high-level questions of patent law and institutional design. As
noted, Congress has already demonstrated its willingness to statutorily overrule assimilationist doctrine and legislate patent exceptionalism.371 This is
evident in Congress’s overruling of Holmes Group in the 2011 America Invents Act, which extends jurisdiction over patent appeals to the Federal Circuit when a patent issue arises in a compulsory counterclaim.372 In the
context of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, legislation may be warranted
to allow the Federal Circuit greater authority to review facts found by district courts given the Federal Circuit’s expertise and familiarity with patent
litigation.373 Furthermore, although the Supreme Court’s Teva decision resolves the question of appellate review of claim construction (at least for
now), there are defensible reasons for favoring more authority for the Federal Circuit in this domain. In the APA context, Congress could similarly
legislate a less deferential standard of review by the Federal Circuit based on
its evaluation of relative institutional expertise.374 Congress, after all,
spearheaded patent exceptionalism by creating the Federal Circuit, and it is
well positioned to assess whether that court’s place in the judicial system
should deviate from established norms.
368. Clark, supra note 33, at 101.
369. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 126, at 317 (“[A] normatively attractive level of deference [to the PTO] could differ in certain ways from the deference provided by administrative
law doctrine.”); Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office’s
Troubled Quest for Managerial Control, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2051, 2056 (2009) (“[The Federal
Circuit] can lay claim to specialization and expertise—two characteristics that administrative
law scholars typically see as the exclusive attributes of agencies.”).
370. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 163 (1999).
371. See supra text accompanying notes 161–162.
372. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 19(b), 125 Stat. 284, 331
(2011).
373. Dreyfuss, supra note 101, at 824 (“Congress could effectuate an even more dramatic
change by revising the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to give the Federal Circuit more power
to review facts or power to decide when to review facts.”).
374. Cf. Kumar, supra note 33, at 277 (observing conflict between Congress’s objective of
allowing some degree of patent exceptionalism and the Supreme Court’s project of eliminating
exceptionalism).
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Turning to rhetorical uses of assimilation, such doctrinal maneuvers
may be quite troubling. First, they tend to obscure the exceptional nature of
new doctrine, providing more legitimizing cover than may be warranted.
Second, such assimilation may be problematic when the Court designs rules
specifically for patent disputes but frames them in the language of universality, thus ensuring their (potentially inappropriate) application to other contexts. For instance, the Court’s four-factor test in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange
L.L.C. is well crafted to limit the availability of injunctions for patent trolls,
but it may cause unintended problems in other areas of law.375 Furthermore,
the Court’s holding in Teva that factual findings are to be reviewed for clear
error is well suited to the relatively crisp distinction between intrinsic and
extrinsic evidence in patent claim construction.376 But this distinction may
not be as clear in other areas of law, thus complicating applications of Teva
elsewhere.
In general, the Supreme Court should aim for an “intermediate” form
of legal assimilation that situates patent law within the general legal fold
while still retaining flexibility to tailor doctrinal applications to particular
circumstances. This is the case with the Supreme Court’s adoption of the
“rule of reason”—the quintessential open-ended standard—in antitrust
cases involving patents.377 The Court’s decision in eBay comes close in this
regard, though it somewhat misses the mark. There, the Court created a
broad, equitable framework for determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief. It rejected the Federal Circuit’s exceptional rule that virtually automatically granted an injunction after a finding of infringement and
created a new (arguably, exceptional) standard to govern all injunctions.378
However, as Gergen and his coauthors observe, the Court may have gone
too far in concretizing an analytical framework for injunctions that eliminated rebuttable presumptions that had served other areas of law so well.379
In such cases, the Court should clearly strike down an offending rule but
utilize open-ended language when articulating a new standard intended to
apply to myriad contexts.380
These observations shed further light on the dynamic interplay of the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit. Though the Federal Circuit and the

375. See Gergen et al., supra note 182.
376. See supra notes 118–119 and accompanying text.
377. See Ghosh, supra note 253, at 102 (“The accommodation of patent and antitrust law
occurs through the rule of reason standard.”). But see Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 733,
743–44 (2012) (cautioning against the open-ended nature of the rule of reason).
378. See supra notes 178–182 and accompanying text.
379. See Gergen et al., supra note 182.
380. Cf. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 1155, 1156 (2002) (observing that courts have applied the same patent doctrine
differently in various technological contexts).
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Supreme Court both have their critics, commentators have recognized significant value in the ongoing dialogue between these two courts.381 For example, the Federal Circuit’s enthusiasm for expanding patent rights has been
usefully tempered by the Supreme Court, whose multifactored standards
also counterbalance the Federal Circuit’s penchant for formalistic rules. The
dichotomy between legal universality and exceptionalism is another axis
along which the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit can engage in fruitful dialogue. Like science, law progresses though a “kneading” process of
expansion and contraction, generalization and division.382 Specialized bodies
like the Federal Circuit play a useful role in appreciating the uniqueness of
their subject matter and tailoring rules accordingly. But the Supreme Court
plays a useful role in checking such specialization and resituating specialized
doctrine within the broader fabric of legal thought and practice.
VI. Guiding Principles for Universality and Exceptionalism
Drawing on the foregoing analysis, this Part proposes guidelines for effectively navigating the tension between legal universality and exceptionalism. Certainly, the values of universality and broad legal consistency still
hold much sway, as evidenced by the Supreme Court’s repeated assimilation
of patent law to general legal principles. All rules, however, have exceptions,
and this Part reveals some principles to guide occasional divergences from
norms to achieve greater individualization and specialization.
At the outset, one must question the desirability of strict legal consistency and universality as a normative end. Of course, the elegant, integrated
systems of the formalists and realists possess much aesthetic and logical
appeal. However, in a modern, fragmented, highly specialized society, where
legal fields differ in substantial and technical ways, the value of strictly applying the same rules to all legal contexts is debatable.383 Furthermore, laws
and the subject matter they regulate are highly dynamic, further casting
doubt on the appropriateness of rigid, one-size-fits-all frameworks.384 This
Article takes the position that universality is a qualified good;385 it represents
a worthy overarching objective, but one that should allow for exceptions
381. E.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 77, at 794 (“Sharing their views—learning from one another—could enhance the operation of the patent system, shed light on the costs and benefits
of specialization, ease the path for other specialized courts, and improve judicial administration more generally.”); Lee, supra note 12, at 81 n.444.
382. Cf. Holton, supra note 326, at 15–16 (“Indeed, the advancement of science has depended on the interaction and alternation of [lumpers and splitters]—as if science moves on
two feet.”).
383. See Grossi, supra note 35, at 1010–11. Ironically, of course, it was precisely the
growth of legal complexity that motivated earlier calls for greater uniformity in federal law,
such as the APA. Marcus, supra note 13, at 1211, 1214.
384. See Scalia, supra note 151, at 375–78 (noting post-APA legal developments that have
undermined the value of strict adherence to the APA).
385. Cf. Marcus, supra note 13, at 1221 (“[T]rans-substantivity is not ‘sacred.’ ” (citation
omitted)).
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when warranted. The following three principles can guide and limit such
exceptionalism.
First, courts and other decision makers must balance a general preference for consistency against considerations of specialized institutional competence. For instance, the presence of the Federal Circuit, a quasi-specialized
appellate court, substantively differentiates patent law from other areas of
legal practice. It was this difference in institutional structure (manifested in
one of the Federal Circuit’s predecessor courts) that informed Attorney
General Clark’s recommendation that the APA should not apply to the Patent Office. After all, the traditional policy rationale of appellate deference to
agencies based on their technical expertise has less traction where the appellate court also possesses significant subject-matter expertise. The Federal
Circuit’s review of the PTO is simply not like the Ninth Circuit’s review of
the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. In other areas of law,
where a specialized, expert institution upsets familiar agency and court relationships, general rules predicated upon those familiar relationships need
not necessarily apply. As a broad matter, the Supreme Court has shown a
willingness to defer to semi-specialized courts based partly on their expertise. Such is the case with the early history of the Federal Circuit as well as
with the Court’s contemporary relationship with the D.C. Circuit, which has
become a “de facto, quasi-specialized administrative law court.”386 While periodic generalist review and intervention is valuable,387 there is also value to
allowing specialized courts to tailor doctrine based on their expert knowledge of specific subject matter.
Second, a program of universality must be attentive to the rationale underlying particular statutes and doctrines. Where that rationale does not apply, or does not apply with significant force, there may be reason to deviate
from the rule. Like the realists of the early twentieth century, such an approach to universalism avoids a “mechanical jurisprudence” in favor of tying
rules to their animating rationales and theories.388 An example of this type of
functionalist reasoning arises in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.389
There, the Supreme Court confronted the question of whether judges or
juries should perform claim construction. The Court acknowledged that
claim construction rests on factual inquiries; ordinarily, this would counsel
toward assigning this task to juries based on the general rule that juries are
entrusted with evaluating the demeanor of witnesses, sensing “the mainsprings of human conduct,” and reflecting community standards.390 But the
386. Christopher P. Banks, Judicial Politics in the D.C. Circuit Court, at XIII
(1999).
387. Golden, supra note 151, at 553–54 (arguing that Supreme Court intervention does
not necessarily prevent a semi-specialized court from leading doctrinal developments in a particular field and that occasional Supreme Court intervention may be valuable).
388. See Grossi, supra note 35, at 965; Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 Colum.
L. Rev. 605, 620–21 (1908).
389. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
390. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 389–90 (quoting Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289
(1960)).
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Supreme Court observed that these considerations are less relevant to patent
litigation compared to other forms of litigation, and “are much less significant than a trained ability to evaluate the testimony in relation to the overall
structure of the patent.”391 In this instance, the Court recognized that the
rationale behind a general rule did not apply with great force to claim construction, and so the rule need not apply as well. The Court’s attentiveness
to the rationale behind a statute or doctrine—rather than mechanical application of the rule—provides a model for legal assimilation writ large.
Third, a program of doctrinal assimilation should take advantage of
open-ended standards capable of context-specific differentiation rather than
rigid rules. As Michael Carroll argues, casting intellectual property doctrine
in the form of flexible standards can mitigate “uniformity costs” from rigidly applying the same rules to myriad contexts.392 More broadly, standards
can introduce valuable adaptability and contextual sensitivity in otherwise
unified legal regimes. Thus, as mentioned, the four-factor framework for
injunctive relief in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C. represents a promising
approach, though it comes up short.393 In its ideal form, this framework
would comprise a more open-ended standard that courts could tailor to
individual legal areas, though with appropriate guidance for applying it in
the context in which it arose—patent litigation.394 Thus, for instance, a violation of a physical property right might give rise to a presumption of irreparable harm, but infringement of a patent might not. In a similar vein, the
Court’s decision in Octane Fitness, L.L.C. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. regarding how to identify “exceptional” cases for awarding attorney’s fees usefully eliminates the Federal Circuit’s narrow, overly-specialized rule while
leaving enough flexibility to apply a broad standard to myriad litigation contexts.395 Following these principles, the Supreme Court can effectuate the
longstanding objective of legal consistency while accommodating the particularities of a complex legal landscape.
Conclusion
This Article has examined the tension between universality and exceptionalism to shed new light on the Supreme Court’s recent patent jurisprudence. It has argued that, in addition to reining in expansive patent doctrine
and favoring standards over rules, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions (extending as far back as the establishment of the Federal Circuit) reveal a consistent drive to eliminate doctrinal exceptionalism and assimilate patent
doctrine to what it regards as general legal concepts. This assimilationist
project has taken several forms, including: conforming patent law to trans391. See id. at 390.
392. Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55 Am. U. L. Rev. 845, 890–91 (2006).
393. See supra text accompanying notes 378–380.
394. See Lee, supra note 12, at 65–71.
395. See supra Section III.D.2.
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substantive regulatory frameworks like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the APA, and jurisdictional statutes; invoking general equitable principles to
eliminate exceptional patent rules; borrowing from unrelated areas of law to
illuminate patent doctrine; adopting ordinary understandings of legal concepts rather than specialized ones; and eliminating specialized per se rules
and presumptions at the intersection of patent and antitrust law. In various
ways, both substantively and rhetorically, the Supreme Court has sought to
bring patent law within its conception of mainstream legal norms and
standards.
The Court’s assimilationist project arises from a diverse set of motivations. In large part, it responds to the exceptionalist patent doctrine generated by the Federal Circuit. Assimilation also serves the related purpose of
reining in the Federal Circuit itself, which has tended to produce rather selfserving doctrine. More broadly, the Court’s assimilationist project reflects
the Supreme Court’s consideration of a wider array of policy interests than
typically occupies the Federal Circuit. It also eases cognitive burdens by allowing the Court to invoke familiar legal concepts and sidestep deep engagement with the technicalities of patent law. Finally, assimilating (or appearing
to assimilate) patent law to existing norms has rhetorical value, lending
greater legitimacy to new doctrine.
Turning to normative considerations, this Article has argued for a refined, selective exceptionalism for patent doctrine. In some contexts, the
Court has appropriately conformed patent law to general legal concepts.
However, the unique nature of patent law, particularly the role and expertise
of the Federal Circuit, warrants deviation from general legal principles in
some areas. For instance, the presence of a quasi-specialized appellate court
pushes against traditional canons of deference to district court and agency
fact-finding. In this realm, congressional intervention would be helpful to
determine and legislate an appropriate degree of patent exceptionalism. Notwithstanding the Federal Circuit’s unique strengths, the Supreme Court has
been appropriately vigilant in policing attempts to expand the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction. Applying patent-tailored doctrine to other legal areas
under the rubric of assimilation, however, may be problematic. Overall, the
Supreme Court would be well served to utilize flexible standards rather than
rigid rules when assimilating patent doctrine to broader legal concepts.
The Supreme Court’s assimilation of patent doctrine sheds light on the
wider challenge of maintaining coherence and consistency across diverse areas of law. Through considering institutional expertise, focusing on the rationales underlying general rules, and articulating open-ended standards
rather than rigid rules, the Supreme Court can unify diverse areas of law
within a coherent set of transcendent principles while still maintaining flexibility for field-specific delineation. Ultimately, perhaps even Leibniz would
approve.

